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Th e Dustbin of the Republic of Letters 
Pierre Bayle’s “Dictionaire” as an 
encyclopedic palimpsest of errors
Koen Vermeir 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifi que, Paris1
Abstract: Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, a landmark in in-
tellectual history, is a curious text. Originally intended as a collection of all 
errors, it became an encyclopedia of everything, enfolding rampantly grow-
ing footnotes that commented on every imaginable topic. Instead of looking 
at Bayle’s theoretical statements in the Dictionnaire, I explore Bayle’s writing 
practice, his critical method and his practice of forming judgments. A close 
study of the textual, paratextual and contextual characteristics of the fi rst entry 
of the Dictionnaire (the entry “Abaris”) allows me to fi nd out how Bayle made 
up his mind at every stage during a contemporaneous controversy on divina-
tion. In this way, we are able to see Bayle’s mind in action while he is judging 
the contradictory information he receives and the to-and-fro movement of 
changing opinions he is confronted with. Th is examination yields new insights 
to Bayle’s practical attitudes towards key issues in his oeuvre, including scep-
ticism, rationalism, superstition and tolerance. At the same time, the article 
clarifi es how Bayle was involved in the Republic of Letters and how he related 
to his local context in Rotterdam.
Keywords: Bayle, critical practice, superstition, error, credulity, scepticism, 
Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, paratext, Aymar, divining rod, Republic 
of Letters, toleration. 
1 CNRS (UMR 7219, SPHERE); Sorbonne Paris Cité, F–75013 Paris, France. I would like 
to thank the two anonymous referees and Jeff  Loveland for their useful comments, and Antony 
McKenna for embodying the true spirit of the Republic of Letters. 
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Introduction
On March 7th 1697, the French Huguenot exile Pierre Bayle reported on a 
new cure that was popular in the Netherlands. A German doctor claimed to cure 
all kinds of diseases by putting a sympathetic powder in the urine of the patient, 
and other empirics had started to imitate him. Bayle took their claims seriously 
and did not consider such a cure at a distance impossible, physically speaking. He 
even ridicules the established physicians who rallied against the new remedy. Bayle 
joked that they reject everything they do not understand as impossible.2 Later, 
however, in the addenda to the entry “Abaris” in the second edition of his Diction-
naire, Bayle made a volte-face in his judgement. Now he followed the authority 
of the established physicians and rejected the phenomenon as illusory. Ironically 
(and implicitly referring to himself), he adds that those who had been tricked had 
switched their opinion from approval to the utmost disdain.3
Th is little episode turns around an issue that was central to Bayle’s work, 
and to the reception of his ideas in the Enlightenment. Bayle was one of 
the most prominent thinkers at the turn of the seventeenth century. A cen-
tral fi gure in the fl ourishing Republic of Letters, he maintained an extensive 
correspondence network that provided him with crucial information.4 Bayle 
published the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres from 1684 till 1687, but 
it was especially his Dictionnaire that made a huge impact and became one of 
the most read works in the eighteenth century. His work was closely studied 
by the major thinkers of the Enlightenment and Bayle would become widely 
2 Bayle to Mr. ***, 7 March 1697 in Pierre Bayle, “Lettres de Mr Bayle,” in Oeuvres diverses 
de Mr. Pierre Bayle, vol. IV, La Haye: Compagnie des libraires, 1737, pp. 525–888, 735–736. 
In the following, we will refer to Bayle’s correspondence by mentioning the correspondents 
and date. Because a new critical edition of all Bayle’s correspondence is being published by the 
Voltaire Foundation in Oxford, which will replace the older editions, references to pages and 
editions are not given here. Th e older editions are the 1737 edition given above and reprinted 
in volume IV of Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres Diverses, Hildesheim, 1968. More correspondence can 
be found in Émile Gigas, ed., Choix de la correspondance inédite de Pierre Bayle, 1670–1706, 
Paris, 1890.
3 Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, Rotterdam: Leers, 1702, vol. 1: Additions 
et corrections pour le Ier Tome, p. ii–iii.
4 Excellent biographies of Bayle are Elisabeth Labroussse, Pierre Bayle, La Haye: Martinus 
Nijhoff , n.d.; Hubert Bost, Pierre Bayle, Paris: Fayard, 2006. For an analysis of his thought, 
see especially Elisabeth Labroussse, Hétérodoxie et rigorisme, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff , 1964; 
Elisabeth Labroussse, Notes sur Bayle, Paris: Vrin, 1987; Antony McKenna and Gianni Paga-
nini, eds., Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, religion, critique, Paris: Honoré 
Champion, 2004. For his early correspondence network, see Antony McKenna, “Les réseaux 
de correspondance du jeune Pierre Bayle,” in La Plume et la toile. Pouvoir et réseaux de corres-
pondance dans l’Europe des Lumières, ed. Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, Arras: Presses de l’Université 
d’Artois, 2001. For Bayle’s later correspondence network, see Antony McKenna, “Les réseaux 
au service de l’érudition et l’érudition au service de la vérité de fait : le Dictionnaire historique 
et critique de Pierre Bayle,” La Lettre clandestine 20 (2012) (forthcoming). 
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known for his critical spirit, his rejection of “superstition” and his plea for 
tolerance.5 Bayle presented himself, for instance during the controversy with 
Pierre Jurieu, as a critical thinker opposing fanatics, idolaters and impostors. 
Bayle’s volte-face in the episode mentioned above shows, however, that al-
though being a “critical spirit” may be good in theory, one faces considerable 
challenges in practice. Indeed, how should one decide which beliefs should be 
struck down as credulous and which opinions should be tolerated? 
In this paper, I will look in detail at Bayle’s practice of forming judgments 
and of writing his Dictionnaire, and I will analyze some of the practical prob-
lems he faced. I will do this by exploring how Bayle developed the entry 
“Abaris”, the very fi rst entry of the Dictionnaire.6 Bayle’s stratifi ed practice of 
writing makes it possible to uncover how his thinking developed, between dif-
ferent drafts before publication as well as between diff erent editions. First, this 
entry is special, because it incorporates long discussions of a controversy that 
raged at the time Bayle was writing the diff erent versions of the entry. Because 
the phenomena described were so uncommon, and Bayle did not immedi-
ately know what to think of it, the entry “Abaris” allows us to see Bayle in the 
process of making up his mind. We can trace the changes in judgment Bayle 
made about this contemporary event by pairing a study of the paratext of the 
Dictionnaire with a study of the historical context (especially the streams of 
information he received through the Republic of Letters).7 Second, much of 
this entry treats diviner who had found criminals with his divining rod, and 
this provoked important questions of credibility, superstition and even tolera-
tion for Bayle. Th is case sparked an international controversy, with important 
reverberations in Bayle’s hometown of Rotterdam, and this gives us insight 
in to how Bayle related his local context to the Republic of Letters. Finally, 
5 Cf. Werner Schneider, “Concepts of Philosophy,” in Th e Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
pp. 26–44. See also Antony McKenna, “Pierre Bayle et la superstition,” in La Superstition à 
l’âge des Lumières, ed. B. Dompnier, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1998, pp. 49–65. It should be 
noted here that the notion of superstition was changing in Bayle’s time. From a more narrowly 
defi ned worshipping of false religion, it slowly extended to a more general credulity.
6 Ruth Whelan has made close studies of individual articles dealing with superstition, but has 
not paid attention to the evolution of the articles, to Bayle’s critical practice and to his evolving 
judgments over time. Others have described in general how the Dictionnaire came into being, 
without looking at the evolution of concrete articles or without even taking into account the 
diff erences between editions. In particular, scholars have not connected Bayle’s thought with the 
textual, paratextual and material history of the Dictionnaire. See esp. Ruth Whelan, Th e Anatomy 
of Superstition: a study of the historical theory and practice of Pierre Bayle, Oxford, 1989. Leny van 
Lieshout, Th e Making of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionaire, Amsterdam: Holland University Press, 2001. 
Emile Gigas, “La première ébauche d’un ouvrage célèbre,” Bulletin de la Commission de l’Histoire 
des Eglises Wallonnes 7 (1896), pp. 65–74. Leif Nedergaard, “La genèse du ‘Dictionaire historique 
et critique’ de Pierre Bayle,” Orbis Litterarum 13 (1958), pp. 210–227. 
7 For the notion of paratext, see esp. Gérard Genette, Seuils, Paris: Seuil, 1987.
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in studying the entry “Abaris”, I will show that Bayle’s Dictionnaire resembles 
a palimpsest, or rather a sedimentation process, in which the historian can 
uncover, like a paleographer, detective or geologist, layer after layer of a pas-
sionate controversy that raged at the turn of the eighteenth-century.
Bayle’s critical spirit 
Bayle was notorious as a controversial thinker and some contemporaries 
considered him even an outright sceptic.8  
Nevertheless, reason is not powerless for Bayle, and he was never a radical 
sceptic,9 otherwise the project of his Dictionnaire would make no sense. Rath-
er, he believed that we can train our judgement by making critical assessments 
of historical facts. Th is was the aim of his Dictionnaire: an encyclopaedic dic-
tionary meant to educate the public and to eradicate the multitude of errors 
that had crept into the body of knowledge. Bayle believed that knowledge had 
been corrupted because errors were uncritically copied and widely disseminat-
ed. Instead of carefully checking the available sources, using sound judgement 
as well as textual criticism, people were perpetuating the same mistakes again 
and again. In contrast, in his “critical” Dictionnaire, Bayle tried to correct 
these errors by reading diff erent authors, comparing them and applying com-
mon sense. He even took into account the particular interests of the authors 
in order to assess their veracity and prejudices, aiming at weeding out errors 
8 In his Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne (1733), the Swiss theologian Jean Pierre de 
Crousaz accused Bayle of a corrosive scepticism, a complete menace, responsible for all what went 
wrong in the world. For Bayle in the context of scepticism, see e.g. Richard Popkin, “Scepticism,” 
in Th e Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 426–450. Th e question of Bayle’s scepticism has contin-
ued to spark vigorous debate up to the present. For the most recent discussion of Bayle’s scepti-
cism, see José Maia Neto, “Bayle’s Academic Scepticism,” in Everything Connects: In Conference 
with R.H. Popkin, ed. J.E. Force and D.S. Katz, Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp. 264–275; Frédéric Bra-
hami, Le Travail du scepticisme. Montaigne, Bayle, Hume, Paris: P.U.F., 2001; Th omas M. Lennon, 
“What Kind of a Skeptic Was Bayle?,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26. 1 (2002), pp. 258–279; 
Gianluca Mori, Bayle: philosophe, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999; Gianluca Mori, “Scepticisme 
ancien et moderne chez Bayle,” in Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle: La résurgence des phi-
losophies antiques, ed. Antony McKenna and Pierre-François Moreau, Saint-Etienne: Publications 
de l’Université de Saint-Etienne, 2003, pp. 271–290; Gianluca Mori, “Pierre Bayle on scepticism 
and ‘common notions’,” in Th e Return of Scepticism. From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle, ed. Gi-
anni Paganini, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 393–413; Kristen Irwin, “La 
philosophie comme méthodologie: la conception sceptico-rationaliste de la raison chez Bayle,” 
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofi a 120 (2009), pp. 363–376; Jean-Luc Solère, “Scepticisme, métaphy-
sique et morale: le cas Bayle,” in Les « Eclaircissements » de Bayle, ed. H. Bost and A. McKenna, 
Paris: Honoré Champion, 2010, pp. 499–524.
9 Bayle’s alleged “scepticism” has several dimensions, but in this article, I will focus almost 
exclusively on the “sceptical” aspect of Bayle’s historiography..
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in history and philosophy.10 Bayle’s method was essentially textual, however, 
and was applied to fi ction and history in a similar way.11 Many of his entries 
dealt with mythological or semi-mythological fi gures, such as Abaris, a Scythe 
purported to be able to fl y on a golden arrow he received from Apollo. From 
the text of the Dictionnaire, it is not even clear whether Bayle thinks this was 
a historical or rather a mythological fi gure.
In the notes to the Abaris entry, this textual methodology confronts Bayle 
with a problem. Here, Bayle analysed contemporary events, and fi nding the 
truth of the matter was crucial but diffi  cult. How should we make judgements 
about such contemporary historical facts and the knowledge about nature they 
presume? Bayle’s critical method was usually limited to checking and pitting 
written sources against each other. Th e authority of the written text was very 
important for Bayle, but in this case, authoritative sources did not yet exist. 
How do we know whether putting a sympathetic powder in someone’s urine 
might actually cure the person, for instance? In such cases, Bayle’s approach 
would typically be textual, assessing the authors, the contexts and the diff erent 
probabilities of the diff erent written opinions. For Bayle, physical explanations 
could be at most probable and were never certain. Indeed, during the contro-
versy about the marvellous urine-cure, he derided the physicians because they 
denied as impossible everything they did not understand. Bayle, in contrast, was 
convinced that all explanations refer to what we cannot fully understand, and 
all physical principles are in the end self-contradictory.12 Th erefore, Bayle’s fi rst 
opinion that he did not think the cure impossible should not surprise us; it is 
rather his later change of opinion that is striking.13 In his Dictionnaire, he sud-
denly seems certain that the cure was a deceit. He even gives a “psychological” 
10 E.g. the entry “Horace (Publius)”, note A, in Bayle’s Dictionnaire. For Bayle’s historio-
graphical method in its context, see Anthony Grafton, Th e Footnote. A Curious History, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, chapter 7. Jacob Soll, “Empirical History and the 
Transformation of Political Criticism in France from Bodin to Bayle,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 64.2 (2003), pp. 297–316. Dario Perinetti, “Philosophical Refl ection on History,” in 
Th e Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 1107–1140.
11 It was not uncommon to see history as a purely textual discipline, see e.g. Pascal: “Dans 
les matières où l’on recherche seulement de savoir ce que les auteurs ont écrit, comme dans l’histoire 
(…), il faut nécessairement recourir à leurs livres, puisque tout ce que l’on en peut savoir y est 
contenu d’où il est évident que l’on peut en avoir la connaissance entière et qu’il n’est pas possible 
d’y rien ajouter.” Blaise Pascal, “Préface sur le Traité du vide,” in Œuvres complètes, ed. Louis 
Lafuma, Paris: Seuil, 1963, p. 230.
12 Cf. Charles Larmore, “Scepticism,” in Th e Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Phi-
losophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 
pp. 1145–1194.
13 In fact, during the controversy, the proponents of the cure took a position that closely 
resembled Bayle’s position. Th ey rejected the theoretical criticism of established physicians, and 
admitted they did not understand how it worked. Philosophical reasoning was quite useless 
against the proof of experience, they maintained.
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explanation of why so many people were taken in: they were attracted by its 
marvellous nature; or maybe they were fed up with the ineff ectual cures of es-
tablished physicians, and people just liked to exasperate them. Bayle seems to 
have fumbled in changing his judgment, however, going against his own prin-
ciples in favor of the accepted authority of established medicine.
Th is and similar episodes are crucial for understanding Bayle’s project of a 
critical Dictionnaire. In the secondary literature, there has been a lot of discus-
sion of Bayle’s theoretical views, based on fragments dispersed in the Diction-
naire. Bayle’s pronouncements are often taken out of their specifi c contexts, 
however, and integrated in a “philosophy” that was never systematized by Bayle 
himself. In contrast, a close study of Bayle’s reaction to contemporary controver-
sies brings into focus the actual problems Bayle was confronted with in making 
judgments and forming beliefs, and it raises the question of how his Diction-
naire was actually construed. He had originally conceived of his Dictionnaire as 
a point-by-point rebuttal of the famous (but not critical) Grand Dictionnaire 
historique by Louis Moréri. Indeed, he strongly insisted on the necessity of evi-
dence and rigorous critical assessment. Nevertheless, Bayle often also asserted 
that human reason was unable to attain conclusive evidence (except for a few 
“common notions”). Furthermore, experience was equally problematic. In early 
modern natural philosophy, experiments became important to judge claims 
about the natural world, but natural philosophers knew that experiments were 
not self-evident or uncontroversial aff airs.14 Witnesses were needed to attest to 
the results, and in its turn, the credibility of these witnesses needed to be ascer-
tained.15 Bayle himself was not a natural philosopher, and his judgement could 
only be based on the critical assessments of witnesses, of probabilities, and of 
comparisons between reports, credibility and authority. 
So after all, maybe it should not come as a surprise that Bayle, after careful 
consideration, sided with the authority of the medical establishment in the 
case of the urine-cure. Bayle respected the authority of various disciplines, and 
he had no reason to believe he knew better.16 But on what grounds could the 
other position be rejected? Michael Ayers has argued that, according to Bayle, 
we have to arrive at our beliefs through a critical assessment of probability, 
experience and feeling. Of course, others doing the same may arrive at diff er-
ent conclusions. “Th ere is no criterion of truth outside our feelings to decide 
14 Furthermore, experiments were not yet accepted as an evident methodology for natural 
philosophy. Experiments were often treated as curiosities, concretely for the case studied below, 
see e.g. a journal review on Vallemont’s experimental method in “La Physique Occulte,” Biblio-
thèque Universelle et Historique 25 (1693) n° Septembre, pp. 268–270.
15 See e.g. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaff er, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Steven Shapin, A Social 
History of Truth, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995.
16 See e.g. Hubert Bost, Pierre Bayle. Historien, critique et moraliste, Turnhout: Brepols 
Publishers, 2006 (esp. Chapter 1).
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between us”, Ayers writes, “Bayle did not conclude, sceptically, that both sides 
should suspend belief, but that neither is in a position to claim the right to 
persecute the other on the basis of the truth of its own beliefs.”17 One positive 
consequence Bayle was able to derive from this epistemic stalemate, according 
to Ayers, was the importance of toleration. As we will see, however, as with 
judgments and beliefs, this toleration is not so easy to maintain in practice. In 
the next sections, I will analyze in detail how Bayle assessed beliefs, credibility 
and toleration in the concrete case of the “Abaris” article.
Th e writing of the fi rst Dictionnaire entries
“Around the month of December 1690,” Bayle wrote, “I made the plan to 
compose a critical dictionary that would contain a collection of the mistakes 
that were made, by those who made dictionaries as well as by other writers, 
and which would enlist under each name of a man or a city all the errors that 
were disseminated about this man or city.”18 From 1689 onwards, Bayle had 
collected notes for a corrected edition of the famous (but uncritical) diction-
ary by Moréri.19 Th e project fell through, however, because there were already 
too many competing corrected editions in progress.20 In consultation with the 
publisher Reinier Leers, Bayle decided to write his own critical Dictionnaire, 
which would not contain a narrative with the current state of knowledge, but 
only an enumeration of the errors found in other works. At the end of 1692, 
Bayle published the Projet, a fi rst sketch of his Dictionnaire, which presented 
a selection of entries together with an explanation of his project. He made clear 
that it was not easy to collect all the errors about a certain subject, because of the 
need to read diverse authors, the criticisms of their views by others, the rebuttals 
17 Michael Ayers, “Th eories of Knowledge and Belief,” in Th e Cambridge History of Se-
venteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Michael Ayers and Daniel Garber, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 1003–1061. Quotation p. 1041. Ayers supposes that the argument 
for ignorance holds for all kinds of beliefs; we will come back to this later in this paper.
18 Pierre Bayle to his nephew Gabriel de Naudis, 22 May 1692, cited in Paul Hazard, La 
Crise de la conscience européenne (1680–1715), Paris: Fayard, 1961, p. 104–105. In fact, a fi rst 
announcement of this work was already made by Bayle’s publisher Leers in the September–No-
vember 1690 issue of the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans (p. 136). Leers had already started 
printing in December 1690, when the entries for the fi rst three letters of the alphabet were al-
ready complete, so it seems plausible that Bayle had rethought his project a few months before. 
Th ey had to interrupt work on the Dictionnaire, however, because of a controversy instigated by 
Bayle’s colleague Pierre Jurieu. See also Bayle, “Projet d’un Dictionaire Critique à Mr. De Ron-
del,” the introduction to Pierre Bayle, Projet et Fragmens d’un Dictionaire Critique, Rotterdam: 
Leers, 1692. Th e introduction to the Projet does not have page numbers, and for convenience, 
I will refer to the paragraph numbers in the margins. 
19 Th e manuscript of Bayle’s notebook is kept in Copenhagen: Pierre Bayle, Tenerali delinea 
errorum alicuius momenti emendatorum, Royal Library, Copenhagen: ms Th ott 1205, 1689.
20 See e.g. Van Lieshout, Th e Making of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionaire, pp. 1–7.
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by the original authors, and even this was not suffi  cient to form a good judge-
ment on the topic. Searching and rebutting errors is like a hunt, Bayle muses, 
sometimes easy, when one fi nds the game already killed or driven in a corner, 
at other times diffi  cult, when the animal evades the blow or stages a vigorous 
counter attack, even if it is already pierced by a hundred spears (Projet §3).
Bayle advises to suspend judgement, but only as an instrumental strategy, 
until you have collected all the necessary information and have heard all sides of 
the debate. His project aims at assisting people in this task. Bayle did not want 
to present “his” truth, but to present all sides of the debate impartially (Projet §3 
and §9). Ideally, when his project is completed, one would only have to consult 
a certain article in his Dictionnaire Critique in order to know what to believe. If 
a certain claim is mentioned in the Dictionnaire, it should be rejected as false; 
but if it is not mentioned, Bayle remarks somewhat naïvely, one can be sure it 
should be true. He imagines that one would use such a Dictionnaire Critique for 
assuring oneself that what other books and dictionaries mention is actually true. 
Such a critical Dictionnaire would be a touchstone of all these other books, “la 
chambre des assûrances de la Republique des Lettres” (Projet §4).
His Projet, published in 1692 had not received the favorable reception he 
had hoped and he had to abandon his ambitious if somewhat naïve plan. It 
turned out that the “goût qui est à la mode” was not really interested in a col-
lection of all kinds of errors, big and small, and his readers thought it a vain 
pursuit. In his Projet, Bayle had made a big show of defending the usefulness 
of his projected “Dictionary of errors.”21 He tried—rather unsuccessfully—to 
defend the letters and the arts against the supposed superior usefulness of ar-
tisanal work, by stressing their power as diversions and as culture of the soul. 
A collection that listed all the errors in literary and historical works had the 
additional advantage of showing the vanity of the sciences and the weakness of 
man’s spirit, mortifying man’s pride to great moral advantage. His critics were 
not convinced by this additional advantage, however, and Bayle acquiesced to 
the demands to write a more standard dictionary. Th is would become his Dic-
tionaire [sic] Historique et Critique, published at the end of 1696 (“Privilège” 
1697). Apart from reciting errors, he also added a narrative with the true ac-
count (historique). He now devised his composition of an entry in two parts: 
one part purely historical with a narration of facts, the other part a long com-
mentary in footnotes, with proofs and discussions. Here, he followed his pas-
sion of attacking many errors; he even included some philosophical tirades, 
and pleased his readers by including more modern history. 
Because most errors in Moréri were in the entries on mythological fi gures 
and ancient history, also the core of Bayle’s own interests and expertise, he had 
focused his energies there. It turned out that this was exactly the area that his 
public did not fi nd appealing. As a result, Bayle claimed he had to throw away 
21 Pierre Bayle, Dictionaire [sic.] historique et critique, Rotterdam: Leers, 1697, p. 1
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much of the preparatory material that he had already collected (in fact, he tried 
to incorporate it in other entries wherever he could). Th is is the context for un-
derstanding the genesis of the “Abaris” entry of the Dictionaire. Although Bayle 
did not write his entries strictly in alphabetical order, the bulk of his earlier work 
focused on the fi rst letters of the alphabet.22 Th is is already clear in his Projet, 
where sketches of the entries A to C dominate the volume, and when he men-
tions the biblical fi gures he had already prepared.23 Th ere was also a good practi-
cal reason for starting with A: the printer already started printing the beginning 
of the book in July 1693, while Bayle was still writing the consecutive entries, a 
process that would continue until the summer of 1696.
Abaris, a fi gure from ancient history, had supposedly travelled through 
the air, carried by a magical arrow given to him by Apollo. Th e entry “Abaris” 
is not yet part of the entries in the notebook that Bayle started in October 
1689, nor is it part of the selection of entries published in the Projet. Because 
its focus is on a mythological fi gure, Abaris starts with an A, and Bayle cor-
rects in note D the dictionaries of Louis Moréri and Charles Etienne, we can 
surmise that the entry Abaris was started after the publication of the Project, 
in May 1692, but probably before receiving the criticism on the Projet by his 
readers. In this period, Bayle was starting work on his Dictionnaire in earnest, 
commencing with A, but he still aimed at writing a Dictionnaire of errors and 
he still focused on mythological and ancient fi gures. Th is was in the summer 
and fall of 1692.24 After mulling over the criticism on the Projet, he decided to 
change tack, he wrote to Silvestre in September.25 Bayle now needed to adapt 
the older mythological material to his new plan. If he wanted to include it in 
his Dictionnaire, he needed to better capture the tastes of the public.26 Bayle 
therefore included in the entry on Abaris his associations with a simultaneous 
controversy about a diviner. During exactly these same months, from August 
1692 onwards, the French newspapers reported on a diviner who was able to 
trace criminals with his divining rod. Apparently, Abaris’ arrow had the qual-
ity of showing him the way he had to follow, and this reminded Bayle of those 
who can fi nd their way with a divining rod. After consideration, Bayle wrote, 
if everything they told about this rod was true, it was no less marvelous than 
the arrow of Abaris. Indeed, it was not only reputed to fi nd treasures, metals 
and boundary stones, but thieves, murderers and adulterers as well.
22 Although Bayle usually worked on the entries in alphabetical order, his method of writ-
ing was to a large extent associative, and he sometimes started to work on a later entry already 
if he thought of the topic by association.
23 See the side note p. iii. in Bayle, Dictionaire, 1697 edition.
24 From Bayle’s correspondence, it is clear that he requested information, in particular for 
the B articles already, between August and October 1692 (but he continued to ask for informa-
tion about A articles until September 1693).
25 Bayle to Silvestre, 19 September 1692.
26 Bayle, Dictionaire, 1697 edition, p. ii.
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Bayle’s changing assessment of the Aymar case
Bayle for the fi rst time mentioned the divining rod controversy in his 11 
November 1692 letter to his old friend Vincent Minutoli. He writes: “I would 
have a thousand things to say and to ask you about the young man who sees 
on the water the trace of a ship on which a murderer is fl eeing.”27 In the sum-
mer months, the news had broken that a diviner had been able to fi nd the 
trace of three fugitive murderers by means of his divining rod. On Saturday 
the 5th of July 1692, robbers had murdered a Lyonnais wine merchant, An-
toine Boubon Savetier, and his wife. Th e offi  cials of Lyon, confronted with 
this case, made little progress, until a young wine merchant told them about 
someone with a reputation to fi nd murderers by means of a divining rod. Th is 
farmer, Jacques Aymar Vernay [Vernin], started his quest, guided by his rod, 
travelling over roads and rivers, for hundreds of miles, fi nally capturing one 
of the murderers. In the August issue of the Mercure Galant, the fi rst details 
of the case were recounted in a letter by the Royal Prosecutor in Lyon, and a 
further expansion was printed in the September issue.
Bayle writes to Minutoli that he would be curious to read the letters by the 
physicians Panthot and Barbeyrac, who had endeavored to explain this curi-
ous phenomenon. Th e letter by Panthot was widely distributed in pamphlet 
form in the autumn of 1692, and it also appeared in the October issue of the 
Mercure Galant. In the December 1692 issue of the Bibliothèque universelle et 
historique, Jean Le Clerc reported positively on the work by two other pro-
vincial physicians, Chauvin and Garnier, who had witnessed the case and put 
forward their own explanations. Th e facts of Aymar’s accomplishments were 
recorded in legal documents and testifi ed to by magistrates and other honour-
able men. Th e magistrates of Lyon had already performed some simple tests; 
they buried the murder weapon and some other tools, for instance, and asked 
Aymar to fi nd them, and to distinguish the murder weapon from the others. 
What was decisive for the conviction and execution of the criminal, however, 
was that he—after some wavering—had actually confessed to the crime.
All these events were related in the fi rst reports of the case. Th e controversy 
shook the Republic of Letters, and vigorous discussions and disputes, in which 
many leading intellectuals took interest, started off  in books, pamphlets and in 
the primary journals of the time. In the following sections, I will show how new 
developments were transmitted by correspondence networks and were publi-
cised by journalists and publishers. Bayle, as a central node in the Republic of 
Letters, received the news, communicated about it, and tried to make up his 
mind. By looking at his correspondence, but also by studying textual traces and 
temporal markers in his published work, we will reconstruct how he reacted to 
the news, how he weighs the evidence, how he makes his judgements and how 
27 Bayle to Minutoli, 11 November 1692.
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he fi nally presents it in his published work. Th is entry is a special case that allows 
us to see how the evidence changed and how Bayle’s judgement developed dur-
ing the period that he was writing and revising the Dictionnaire. By unravelling 
this controversy, we can show Bayle’s thinking in action.
In the entry “Abaris”, the discussion of the various stages of the Aymar 
case took over most of the space in interminable footnotes, overcrowding the 
article.28 Th e Dictionnaire is an interesting instance of a text in which de-
veloping authorship is still visible, where the diff erent stages of the text are 
preserved in little hints that we can read as a palimpsest. In a real palimpsest 
the old text has been eff aced in order to reuse the parchment for a new text. 
In Bayle’s writing, however, there is no such destructive moment. In fact, as 
Bayle himself explains, he hardly deleted any text in the consequent editions 
of the Dictionnaire.29 Bayle kept adding to the articles, without much revising 
the already existing text. As we will see in our analysis of the entry “Abaris”, 
he did not only do this between diff erent editions, but also while writing up 
the article for the fi rst edition. In this sense, the text is less a palimpsest than 
a sedimentation of new materials, ideas and judgements. Th e exact metaphor 
to use here is not so important, however. What counts is to make use of the 
textual, paratextual and contextual information in order to uncover the dy-
namic nature of the text.
Bayle gives textual hints as to the temporality of his writing, but especially 
the paratextual elements, i.e. the preface, the lay-out, the division of the para-
graphs and Bayle’s special use of diff erent kinds of footnotes and marginalia, 
can tell us a lot about how this text was constructed, corrected and amended 
over time. Th is also has a bearing on Bayle’s assessment of the Aymar case. We 
can read his shifting assessment of the divining rod case from this text, de-
pending on the stage of the controversy and the new information he received. 
In order to get a full picture of Bayle’s developing judgement, we should there-
fore include the contextual elements related to the controversy. Here we see 
again an analogy with a palimpsest, the reconstruction of the historicity and 
evolution of a document, in this case by a hermeneutical and historical ap-
proach, paying attention to traces of the genesis of the text, to correspond-
ences with contemporaneous events, and to textual temporal indices. Step by 
step, this will allow us to uncover Bayle’s changing judgements. 
28 Bayle, Dictionaire, 1697 edition, art. Abaris, p. 1–5. For Bayle’s footnotes in the context 
of the history of footnotes, see Grafton, Th e Footnote. A Curious History.
29 1702 edition, p. xiv. Th e only exception was the entry “David”, which had provoked 
negative reactions, and which he redressed signifi cantly. Th is was due to Bayle’s quarrel with 
Jurieu and the Consistory of Rotterdam. For Bayle’s writing habits, see Van Lieshout, Th e Mak-
ing of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionaire, pp. 55–68. 
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Th e fi rst edition of the Dictionnaire (1696/7)
In the winter of 1693, Bayle was working hard on his Dictionnaire. He 
had just abandoned his old Project of writing a dictionary of errors and he 
was now revising the old material, especially on the fi rst letters of the alpha-
bet, which he still wanted to incorporate. In a letter of 24 March 1693, he 
writes that he is completely immersed in writing his Dictionnaire, although 
he is still disillusioned about giving up his older Project.30 During his work 
on the entry “Abaris”, he is struck by the controversy on the divining rod 
that had started in France. In the January issue of the Mercure Galant (p. 24-
46), Bayle read the opinion of a much admired philosopher, Nicholas Male-
branche, on divining rods. Malebranche had been asked to pronounce himself 
on the subject some time before. Th e local bishop in Grenoble, Camus, was 
worried about the religious legitimacy of these divining practices.31 His for-
mer student, Pierre Le Brun, had then asked advice from the philosophical 
luminary of his order, Malebranche. Th e latter replied that material causes 
always worked in the same way on the body, given similar circumstances, but 
this was not the case for the divining rod. Th e rod did not work in the hands 
of everyone, the practice seemed to involve the intentions of the diviner and it 
was not clear how the physiology of a murderer would be diff erent from that 
of a good person. Because Malebranche could not fi nd a natural explanation, 
he condemned the practice and attributed the successes of the divining rod to 
the involvement of demons.
When Bayle was mulling over Malebranche’s striking opinion, noting it 
down for his Dictionnaire, he received further news on the case. “While writ-
ing this”, Bayle remarked in note B of the “Abaris” entry, “I learn that the most 
important of these diviners with the rod, who made last summer in Lyon as-
tonishing trials of his art, has been summoned to Paris, and on that great Th e-
atre he has made many discoveries.” Th e February issue of the Mercure Galant 
(pp. 311-313) mentions indeed that Aymar was brought to Paris by Monsieur 
le Prince (the Prince de Condé). It is claimed that by means of his baguette, 
Aymar had found hidden gold and silver, as well as border markers, and traced 
two stolen candlesticks to the goldsmith were they had been sold.32 In January 
30 Bayle to Silvestre, 24 March 1693: “Il se fait trop de Dictionnaires; le Public en sera rebuté 
avant que le mien paroisse ; néanmoins jacta est alea ; je ne voi pas comment je pourrois reculer 
honnêtement.” He had to carefully construct his own niche as to avoid overlap with existing 
dictionaries and dictionaries in progress (see also the introduction to the 1697 edition).
31 After some tests and experiments with dowsers, Le Brun concluded that they lost their divina-
tory powers after asking the Lord to take away their gift if it came from the devil. Th is was one of 
the reasons why Le Brun thought that the devil was involved, and he reported his fi ndings to Mal-
ebranche. See especially Le Brun, “A Monsieur ***. Chanoine de l’Eglise Cathédrale de Grenoble” in 
Pierre Le Brun, Histoire critique des pratiques superstitieuses, vol. 3, 2nd ed., Paris, 1732, pp. 210–218.
32 Th is story was reprinted in the March 1693 issue of the Mercure Historique et Politique, 
pp. 316–317.
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and February 1693, public consensus recognized the startling powers of the 
rod, but many attributed it to the devil.33 Bayle refl ects this judgment in his 
remarks on the case. Th ere were many well attested facts, and Bayle could 
agree with the January issue of the Mercure Galant (p. 15), which stated: “Th e 
facts are attested by a hundred witnesses, profi cient, critical, attentive, & the cir-
cumstances are of such a nature, that cunning would never have been able to see 
things through.” Furthermore, the use of a divining rod was a relative although, 
but it had recently become a rather common practice, used in the French prov-
inces and in Germany. It is exactly because the facts were so unambiguous that 
one could not dismiss it as a fable or a fraud. At the same time, many savants did 
not believe that it could be natural, so for them, the only reasonable option left 
was to attribute the effi  cacy of the divining rod to the devil. As Bayle writes in 
note B, it has forced many people, because of these “phenomenes incontestables” 
to say that demons can produce a hundred things. Bayle, probably with some 
irony, considers that Aymar’s baguette bestows retroactively more credibility on 
the story of the arrow of Abaris. Th is provokes some erudite musings in which 
Bayle associates the rod with other kinds of rods, such as the rod of conjurers, 
which originally derived from the use of the rod in sorcery, but also other his-
torical and mythological rods with special powers, such as the rods of Mercury, 
Minerva, Circe, Moses and the Brahmans.
Bayle is rather neutral in this fi rst account of the controversy. It is clear 
that he was very curious when he fi rst heard the news and wrote to Minu-
toli in November 1692. He had some suspicions on religious grounds, how-
ever, because he added: “How to reconcile this with the book of Proverbs of 
Salomon?”34 Th ese proverbs seem to deny mankind knowledge of wondrous 
things, such as divining, and it is not clear therefore whether it is a legitimate 
practice. Nevertheless, Bayle was not in favor of a demonic explanation, un-
like those who argued for a theological approach.35 Bayle took their arguments 
33 Apart from Le Brun’s and Malebranche’s interventions, there is another long text de-
fending a demonic explanation in Mercure Galant, Janvier 1693, pp. 225–284. In the March 
1693 issue of the Mercure Historique et Politique, it is asserted that this phenomenon will pose 
diffi  culties for Bekker and others who deny the action of the devil, and it is noted that even 
Malebranche, normally against demonic explanations, now had to resort to the Devil.
34 Bayle refers to Proverbs 30:18–20: “Th ere be three things which are too wonderful for 
me, yea, four which I know not:/ Th e way of an eagle in the air; the way of a serpent upon a 
rock; the way of a ship in the midst of the sea; and the way of a man with a maid. / Such [is] 
the way of an adulterous woman; she eateth, and wipeth her mouth, and saith, I have done no 
wickedness.” (King James Bible)
35 In the Journal de Sçavans, 1695, p. 441, it was argued that only theologians have the right 
te decide over such suspect phenomena as the divining rod. In contrast, Bayle did not look 
unfavorably upon the work of Anthonie Van Dale, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle and to a 
lesser extent Balthasar Bekker. Th ey all argued that demons had no or little power in the world. 
Th e fi rst article of Bayle’s Nouvelles de la république des lettres, March 1684, laude Van Dale: 
“c’est rendre plus de service que l’on ne pense à la Religion que de réfuter les faussetés qui semblent la 
13
into consideration, but would pinpoint some specifi c problems with it. Th e 
demonic case rejects the hypotheses that the divining rod is a trick or that it can 
be explained naturally, and they stress the reality of the phenomena. What they 
do not explain, however, is why the devil, the sworn enemy of the human race, 
would help mankind fi nd criminals and uncover other kinds of abuse. If it is not 
clear whether the divining rod is a natural phenomenon, the eff ect of fraud, or 
caused by demons, the only thing we can do is to suspend our judgment. Bayle 
uses subtle ambiguity and irony to describe the case, so he does not have to take 
sides, and he avoids making an explicit judgment. Despite his enthusiasm, it is 
not entirely clear whether he believes in the powers of the divining rod, even if 
he promotes its utility. He may be employing irony, or at least he might be hedg-
ing himself against later developments that could contradict him.
When he starts to write about the divining rod controversy in the Diction-
naire, he fi rst uses the conditional : “si tout ce que l’on en dit étoit veritable”. 
After more news comes in, however, he seems to use a diff erent terminology 
and tends to accept the “tant de decouvertes”, “phenomenes incontestables” and 
“epreuves suprenantes”.36 One could imagine that Bayle would be sympathetic 
towards another article that appeared in the February issue of the Mercure 
Galant.37 Th e author argued that we do not know enough about natural forc-
es, and even if natural philosophers propose unconvincing theories, this is 
not enough reason for ascribing certain phenomena to the devil. If we did, 
all kinds of sympathy, gravitation, light and many other phenomena would 
favoriser. Les Pères de l’ancienne Eglise n’ont pas été assez délicats dans le choix des preuves [...]c’est 
à nous qui vivons dans un siècle plus éclairé à séparer le bon grain d’avec la paille, je veux dire, à 
renoncer aux fausses raisons, pour ne nous attacher qu’aux preuves solides de la Religion Chrétienne, 
que nous avons en abondance.” Th e controversy around Bekker’s work was in full swing in 1693 
and 1694, during the divining rod controversy. On 5 March 1693, Bayle writes to Minutoli 
that l’Histoire de la diablerie de Loudun had just been printed in Amsterdam. Th e book shows 
that the pretended possession of the nuns was all a deception and Bayle adds: “On fera plaisir à 
Mr. Bekker de réduire à des illusions & à des Artifi ces humains une aff aire comme celle-là.” 
36 Th ere may be some irony here, but Bayle keeps his assertions ambiguous. It is important 
to note that Buissière attests that everyone believed in the rod at the time, and that “dans cette 
chaleur il n’estoit pas permis à un homme raison[n]able de s’op[p]oser à ce tore[r]nt” (Buissière to 
Bayle, 25 July 1698). Note also that a similar action at a distance is responsible for both the 
divining rod and the urine-cure, which Bayle accepted in the beginning and rejected later. 
37 In fact, Bayle criticizes the article in the entry “Zahuris” of his Dictionnaire. He does not 
touch on the main argument of the article, but rejects its wrong representation of Martin Del 
Rio’s views. Th is is, however, at a much later stage in the controversy, when Bayle is writing the 
letter Z. Van Lieshout suggest Bayle had started earlier on the “Zahuris” article, prompted by 
the association with the Aymar case elaborated in “Abaris” (Van Lieshout, Th e Making of Pierre 
Bayle’s Dictionaire, p. 63). I would object that Bayle does not have the controversy freshly in 
mind when he wrote the “Zahuris” article, because he wrongly remembers Aymar’s fi rst name as 
Pierre instead of Jacques. If Bayle did write this entry in the fall of 1696, the Aymar case must 
have made a considerable impression upon his mind, something that is corroborated by the fact 
that he made so many additions to the entry. 
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be demonic. Such a view mirrors Bayle’s conviction that reason is limited and 
that we cannot penetrate the secrets of nature. Bayle’s epistemic convictions 
and his interest in errors, mythology and judgment made him curious about 
this case. Indeed, he promises more on the subject in an article under the 
heading “Rabdomantie”. He would never publish such an entry, however, 
maybe because by the time he arrived at writing the R entries, the controversy 
had taken some unexpected turns.
As is clear from the fi rst pages of the January issue of the Mercure Galant, 
an abundance of facts confi rmed the effi  cacy of the divining rod. Th ese suc-
cesses were corroborated by the new experiments executed by the Prince de 
Condé and reported in the February issue of the Mercure Galant. In the fol-
lowing months, people presented more natural explanations of the phenom-
enon: Comiers presented his views in the March issue of the same journal, and 
Pierre Lorrain de Vallemont published a book length study and natural expla-
nation of the Aymar case at the end of March.38 Some dissenting voices were 
also heard, however. In the March issue of the Mercure Historique et Politique 
(p. 329), it is suggested it might be a fraud after all, and the case might be 
similar to the story of the golden tooth or the prophets of the Dauphiné.39 Th e 
author had also read an English account of diviners in Ceylon who used the 
rod for fi nding criminals, but upon closer inspection it proved to be a hoax. 
It must have been around the time Bayle read these articles, in April 1693, 
that he added a sentence to the main text of the “Abaris” entry. He wrote: “If 
the arrow [of Abaris] had had the gift that one attributes to the rod of Jaques 
Aymar, he would have been able to do great service to the world.” 
Th e idea of the usefulness of the divining rod had been circulating for 
some time. Chauvin, in a letter to Mme la marquise de Senozan, and printed 
in various venues, had written that it was “a discovery, so useful for the con-
servation of the good and of the life of man.”40 Also the author of the Mercure 
Historique et Politique article mentioned above suggested that people would 
now be afraid to hide their money from the tax collectors. Bayle concurred 
38 Pierre Lorrain de Vallemont, La Physique Occulte, ou Traité de la baguette divinatoire, 
Paris, 1693.
39 Bayle’s attention will have been picqued by  the mention of the Camisards, who were 
central in his controversy with Jurieu. For the golden tooth, see Robert Jütte, “A Medical Mir-
acle Revisited: Th e Enlightenment Debate on a Miraculous Golden Tooth,” in Medicine and 
Religion in Enlightenment Europe, ed. Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007, pp. 195–204. For the prophets, see Koen Vermeir, “Th e ‘physical prophet’ and 
the powers of the imagination. Part I: a case-study on prophecy, vapours and the imagination 
(1685–710),” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philoso-
phy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35. 4 (2004), pp. 561–591.
40 Pierre Chauvin, Lettre de M. Chauvin [...] a madame la marquise de Senozan, sur les 
moyens dont on s’est servy pour découvrir les Complices d’un assassinat commis à Lyon, le 5. de Juillet 
1692, Lyon: Chez J. Bapt. et Nicolas De Ville, 1692. Chauvin rejected the pirated editions of 
his letter and the version published in the October 1692 issue of the Mercure Galant. 
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when he added a footnote G to the “Abaris” entry (and he added a cross-
reference in the margin of footnote B, to make clear that a new stage of the 
discussion continued later in the text). Jealousy would be unnecessary, Bayle 
claimed, because the baguette would make sure no adultery would be com-
mitted, and everyone would make sure to keep an upright reputation. “Th e 
greatest number of crimes, the most dangerous sins, know that those who 
commit them in the hope that the public will know nothing about it, will 
cease at the memory of the rod.” An article in the April edition of the Mercure 
Historique et Politique (pp. 447–448) even suggests it is a plot by the state : 
“the Ministers of France use everything [...] in order to frighten the people & 
to force them to bring to the Monnoyes the money that most of them have 
hidden.”
When Bayle wrote footnote G, however, some more doubts had been 
thrown on the feats of Aymar. Bayle usually added notes progressively while 
he was working on an entry, and textual and contextual factors confi rm that 
some time elapsed between notes B and G. Indeed, at the end of April, a 
report about a failure by Aymar also appeared in the Journal des Sçavans.41 
Th e procurator of Paris confi rmed some of the successful experiments by 
the Prince de Condé, but the Prince had also asked him to take Aymar to 
some crime scenes, and there, the rod remained immobile. Th is procurator, 
M. Robert, also alluded to more failures by Aymar, which the Prince would 
publicize shortly. Some time may have passed between Bayle’s judgment of 
the utility of Aymar’s rod in the main text of the entry, and the footnote, in 
which he incorporates the recent negative news. Bayle highlights the new de-
velopments by means of textual temporal markers. “I just learned”, he writes, 
“that those who counted on so many advantages, & so many victories over the 
unbelievers, fi nd themselves far out in their reckoning.” Nevertheless, “quoy 
qu’il en soit”, he is explicit that he will not take back his words about the utility 
of the divining rod.42 Th e new information did not prompt him to change his 
views; he even strengthens his rhetoric: “In the hands of such a great traveler 
as Abaris [circulating everywhere the virtues of the rod], the rod would have 
occasioned the reformation of morals by everyone.” Bayle in these passages is 
still fascinated by the divining rod as well as with the twists and turnings of 
the controversy. Th is history in itself merits a whole article, he proclaims, and 
he again projects to deal with it in the entry “Rabdomantie”.
An important turning point in the case took place in April and May of 
1693. Th e Prince de Condé presented Aymar as a curiosity to noblemen and 
dignitaries, and he had to solve thefts and fi nd hidden gold or silver. Aymar 
41 “Extrait d’une lettre écrite au P. Chevigny, Assistant du Pere General de l’Oratoire”, in 
Journal de Sçavans, 27 April 1693.
42 Th is confi rms the fact that Bayle almost never changes text previously written. Th e an-
nouncement here also seems to refl ect explicitly on his conviction that he does not need to 
retract the previous judgment.
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was brought to the duchess of Hannover (residing at the hôtel de Guise), for 
instance, to the mansion of M. de Gourville and to the castle of Chantilly 
(the residence of the Condés). In the reports, publicised by de Condé’s fol-
lowers in many journals and broadsheets during May and June 1693, it was 
stressed that Aymar failed miserably each time in turn. Th e Mercure Galant 
published the denunciation already in its April 1693 issue (pp. 262–294); 
and the Mercure Historique et Politique (May 1693, pp. 558–567), cited by 
Bayle, included fragments from letters by M. Robert and the House of Condé 
in which Aymar’s failures were recounted. Th ese reports even suggest that the 
fi rst accounts of the successful experiments with de Condé had been mislead-
ing and erroneous. Th e author stated that the proofs of the failure of Aymar 
are so strong that no one dares to contradict them. Many savants concurred: 
the journal issue mentions that Abbé Nicaise, for instance, a regular corre-
spondent of Bayle who wrote to him about the Aymar case, had become con-
vinced that Aymar was a fraud.43 
Bayle closely follows the opinion of the author of the Mercure Historique 
et Politique article when he added a new note H to his text, probably in June 
1693. Th is later addition refl ects a very diff erent judgment, and the language 
is now stark and condemning: “Mr. le Prince de Condé […] has turned round 
all the trophies of the partisans of Jaques Aymar. Th is poor man has failed so 
pitiably the tests of his powers which one has wanted to make at the Hôtel 
de Condé, that he has lost his whole reputation.” Th e time for doubting and 
suspending judgment is over: “il n’y a plus de lieu à chicaner sur l’incertitude”. 
Suddenly, the Aymar case acquires new importance for Bayle, because it is 
now clearly one of these errors and illusions that he set out to battle with his 
Dictionnaire. He is aware that even the best minds are so easily tricked by 
impostors. He disagrees with those who say that they lived in an enlightened 
time (“un siecle aussi philosophe”), and that impostors were now more easily 
exposed than in earlier, more credulous times. It is true that there are more 
people now capable to combat illusions, but “notre siecle est aussi dupe que les 
autres”. Just like before, the world likes all the impostures that fl atter its pas-
sions, and it does not respect co men less. Bayle gives a long citation from the 
Mercure article, chiding Vallemont and others for still defending Aymar, and 
for trying to cook up credible explanations for his failure.
Again, the temporal indications in the text hint at the speed of the events, 
which took Bayle by surprise: “one has just heard that the rule of this rod has 
been very short, & that it has found its fatal hour at the Hôtel de Condé” he 
adds to the main text. In note H, he states: “Hardly has it lasted in Paris as 
much time as it takes to compose & to print an article of this Dictionary”. 
Indeed, as we have seen, he started to compose the Abaris entry in the fall of 
43 In his letter to Bayle, 26 June 1694, Nicaise writes for instance about a new edition of Le 
Brun’s book. Although this case is worn-out, he writes, he hopes the book will be well received.
n
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1692, when the news about Aymar was broached, and he has been adding to 
the article continuously since then. Now the case seemed to be closed already, 
and he could still incorporate it in the fi nal version of the article. Bayle must 
have incorporated these new developments in June, after receiving the May 
issue of the Mercure Historique et Politique. On 29 June, Bayle mentions in a 
letters to Minutoli and Constant that they will start printing his Dictionnaire 
soon, and he considers the fi rst pages of the Dictionnaire ready for the press. 
Th e Abaris entry would only be printed mid September, however, because the 
publisher had to wait for the new type that he had ordered especially for the 
Dictionnaire. 
By the 14th of September, when Bayle had just received the fi rst printed pages, 
his passion and indignation ignited by the Aymar case had calmed somewhat. 
In a letter to Vincent Minutoli, he writes more positively about Vallemont’s 
defence of Aymar (the Physique Occulte had just been reprinted in Amsterdam) 
and he seems to like the fact that Vallemont explains everything mechanically, 
by means of fl ows of corpuscles, without having recourse to demons or spirits, 
as Malebranche had done.44 Much more had happened by this time: many more 
defences and detractions of the Aymar case had been published, and although 
Aymar’s feats might have been defi nitively rejected in Paris after the experiments 
by Condé, things were not so clear cut in the Republic of Letters. Th ere were 
virulent controversies on the divining rod in the popular journals, such as the 
fi ght between Comiers and Le Brun in the summer issues of the Mercure Gal-
ant. Also Bayle’s close acquaintances wrote about the case. In September, for 
instance, Le Clerc gave a long and rather positive review of Vallemont’s book in 
his Bibliothèque universelle et historique (pp. 268–278).
By September 1693, Balthasar Bekker had also published the last two 
books of his Betoverde Weereld, in which he defended Vallemont’s Cartesian 
explanation of the divining rod. Bekker’s work was well known to Bayle, and 
he respected it. Bekker had read about the negative results of the Prince de 
Condé’s experiments, and carefully weighed all the testimonials. What cut 
the knot to the advantage of Aymar, Bekker pointed out, was the fact that 
some credible men had themselves the gift of dowsing. Furthermore, it be-
came clear that Cornelis van Beughem, a good friend of Bayle as well as Bek-
ker, was a dowser too. A few experiments by a prejudiced and sceptical Prince 
could not stand up against so many positive testimonials, especially if Bek-
ker’s personal relations were involved.45 In November, Bayle’s friend Henri 
44 Bayle to Minutoli, 24 September 1693: “On a réimprimé à Amsterdam le livre de Mr. 
De Vallemont, Prètre & Docteur en Th éologie, sur la Baguette Divinatoire. Il explique tout ce qui 
fait Jaques Aymar, par la Mécanique, & les Ecoulemens de Corpuscules, sans recourir à la direction 
d’aucun Esprit, comme le P. Malebranche. Le Livre est assez curieux.”
45 Balthasar Bekker, Betoverde Weereld, Amsterdam: Daniel Van Den Dalen, 1693, Book 4, 
chapter 23. Th e French edition, Balthasar Bekker, Le Monde Enchanté, Amsterdam: Pierre Rot-
terdam, 1694, contains some additions but the general argument remains the same.
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Basnage de Beauval gave a critical but not unsympathetic review of Valle-
mont’s book in his Histoire des ouvrages des savans (pp. 98–116). After reading 
Vallemont’s work, the real effi  cacy of the rod was still left in doubt (p. 99), 
Basnage thought. Although it was quite possible that the case was a delusion, 
like the case of the golden tooth (a famous imposture exposed by Anthonie 
Van Dale), Vallemont has written a very nice work that will keep the reader 
attentive and gratify his curiosity (p. 116).
Of course, Bayle was not able to take any new developments or literature 
into account after the pages were printed in September 1693. Furthermore, 
he had a lot of personal problems at the time, due to his quarrels with Pierre 
Jurieu. Th is took so much time and energy that some days he could hardly 
concentrate on his Dictionnaire, he claimed. On 30 October 1693, Bayle was 
dismissed from his post as professor at the Ecole Illustre at Rotterdam. Jurieu 
would continue to pester him by accusing Bayle of all kinds of misdeeds and 
by denouncing Bayle’s published work, including his Dictionnaire, with the 
Rotterdam authorities. Th e fi rst volume of the Dictionnaire was fi nally ready 
in August 1695.46 Booksellers ordered so many copies that the publisher was 
obliged to do an extra print run of 1000 copies, but he forbade Bayle (who 
would like to keep adding and correcting) to make substantial changes.47 In 
the Abaris entry, Bayle only made two small changes, one of them adding an 
erudite comment to his discussion of the utility of the arrow of Abaris and 
the rod of Aymar: they did not have to fear the accusation of uselessness made 
by Origen. Th is is nevertheless striking, because he had already debunked the 
divining rod in the rest of the text. Had he changed his mind again and did he 
become more positively disposed towards the rod? 
46 Bayle to Constant, 22 August 1695.
47 Bayle to Constant, 4 July 1697. Th e changes were also listed in a short section “additions 
& corrections”, to the 1st tome of the 1697 edition of the Dictionaire, pp. 1353–1358.
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A new controversy
Th e fi rst edition of Bayle’s Dictionnaire fi nally appeared at the end of Oc-
tober 1696. In the beginning, it circulated with some diffi  culty because of war 
embargos and because the book was censured in France. Th e work received a 
mixed response in the Republic of Letters and provoked quite a scandal.48 By 
May 1698, the fi rst edition was sold out, and the work of fi nalizing a second 
edition now started in earnest. Bayle had already been writing additional entries, 
but he now started his revisions of the letter A in earnest, based on criticisms 
he had received. As before, the printers tried to keep pace with him. By August 
1698, Bayle had completed the revisions of the letter A, correcting errors, in-
corporating all kinds of changes he desired to make or requested his by readers, 
and adding many new entries.49 Bayle complains about the heavy workload this 
imposed on him: “It is very diffi  cult, while the printers work without a break, 
for the author to satisfy these three things: to make the revision of two big folio 
volumes, to augment them by more than a third, & to correct the proofs.”50
Between the completion of the fi rst edition and the work on the second 
edition, the divining rod controversy had taken a few new turns. When Du 
Bos wrote to Bayle in April 1696, the Aymar case was still on everyone’s mind. 
A new wonder had been reported in Bretagne (an apparition of an army in 
Ruvengal), but no one believed it: “Th e adventure of the rod of Aymar has 
put everyone on guard, from the moment it is about a prodigy.”51 Bayle did 
not believe that a critical spirit held sway, however.52 He thought that the last 
years had been particularly bad for the Republic of Letters. Th e war made 
communication diffi  cult and there were only few new books available in the 
Netherlands.53 “Th e News of the Republic of Letters is quite sterile here”, Bay-
le wrote, “Th e war occupies everyone’s mind. Th e Sciences have never been 
so little cultivated here, as they are now.”54 Furthermore, critical spirit had 
to make room for commercial interests, and good authors did not get their 
work published in Holland.55 Publishers only reprinted some small popular 
books from Paris, fi lled with faits divers, such as books about the divining 
48 Abbé Renaudot was charged with examining the Dictionnaire, and it was considered 
heretical on four counts. It was therefore not allowed to be printed and circulated in France. 
For the reception of the Dictionnaire, see e.g. Bayle to Le Duchat, 5 January 1697; Du Bos to 
Bayle, 15 June 1697.
49 Bayle to La Monnoye, 18 August 1698.
50 Bayle, Dictionnaire, 1702 edition, p. xiv.
51 Du Bos to Bayle, 27 April 1696.
52 See also Bayle, Dictionnaire, 1697 ed., p. 5, note H.
53 See Bayle to Minutoli, 26 August 1694. Pieter Rabus also wrote that there were not 
many foreign books around to review because of the state of war: see De Boekzaal of Europe, 
July–August 1694, p. 119.
54 Bayle to Constant, 29 November 1694.
55 Bayle to Du Bos, 21 October 1696.
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rod. Indeed, Vallemont’s popular book had a second edition in Amsterdam in 
1696.56 Bayle complains about the tastes of the time, but he intimated that 
the publishers did not mind, as long as they were able to sell their books.57 
At the same time, however, journals were fl ourishing.58 Bayle kept a close 
eye on all the diff erent journals that were appearing at the time. Th ere were 
the important ones that have been mentioned already, often edited by close 
acquaintances of Bayle, but numerous new ones sprang up. In these years, a 
Gazette des Savans had been launched in Geneva, a Courrier Galant in Amster-
dam, and in Utrecht, the Latin Nova Bibliotheca was initiated.59 After asking 
Bayle for advice, D’Artis had started his Journal d’Amsterdam,60 and a Nouveau 
Journal des Savans was created by Chauvin. Pieter Rabus, based like Bayle in 
Rotterdam, edited a journal in Dutch, the Boekzaal van Europe, which could 
boast a lot of readers, Bayle remarked.61
If he had known Dutch, Bayle would have been able to read the curious 
news of a new divining rod controversy in his own town, Rotterdam, in the 
May–June 1696 issues of the Boekzaal van Europe. In these pages, the cor-
respondence between Rabus and the famous Dutch microscopist Antoni van 
Leeuwenhoek was published (pp. 495–500, 522–525). New feats of divining 
had sprung up in Holland, and Rabus asked Leeuwenhoek to study the divin-
ing rod with his microscope. Leeuwenhoek was fascinated and did a number 
of successful experiments. His microscopic studies did not give any more in-
sight, however, and after the diviner he worked with had lost his gift, Leeu-
wenhoek did not pursue his research further.62 Of course, it is exactly during 
this time that Bayle was overburdened with fi nishing the second volume of 
the fi rst edition of his Dictionnaire. Between March and October 1696, Bayle 
writes, he was pressured to the extreme by his publisher, and he did not have 
time for anything but fi nishing his Dictionnaire.63 Still, Bayle was interested 
in the journals, and he followed them regularly, even to the extent that he 
gets annoyed that he had to read so much repetition of the same reviews and 
articles in the diff erent journals.64
56 In a letter to Bayle, Buissière bragged that his denunciation of Aymar in 1694 had caused 
much chagrin to “the abbot of Vallemont and his publisher” (my italics), recognizing the com-
mercial interests involved in these controversies. See Buissière to Bayle, 15 July 1698. Buissière 
criticism did not hinder the publication of many reprints and editions of Vallemont’s work, 
however. 
57 Bayle to Constant, 31 May 1696. See also Bayle to Minutoli, 26 August 1694.
58 See Bayle to Minutoli, 8 March 1694; Bayle to Mr.*** [Du Bos], 24 June 1697.
59 Bayle to Minutoli, 5 November 93; Bayle to Minutoli 5 March 1693; Bayle to Mr.*** 
[Du Bos], 24 June 1697 respectively.
60 See Bayle to D’Artis, 8 August 1693.
61 Bayle to Minutoli, 8 March 1694.
62 Cf. the July–August 1696 issue of De Boekzaal of Europe, pp. 152–156.
63 Bayle to Le Duchat, 5 January 1697.
64 Bayle to Mr.*** [Du Bos], 24 June 1697.
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In fact, many of Bayle’s close personal acquaintances were involved in this 
Dutch divining case. Th e controversy originated in a visit by Cornelis van 
Beughem to Rabus, on the 12th of May 1696. Pieter Rabus was a teacher at the 
Erasmian high school of Rotterdam and belonged to a circle of poets, booksellers 
and literati. He founded an intellectual journal, the Boekzaal van Europe,65 styled 
after Bayle’s Nouvelles but published in Dutch, opening the Republic of Letters to 
a new, eager and growing public in Dutch bourgeois society. Rabus was known 
for his fi ght against ignorance, credulity, and dogmatism, and sided with his 
friends Bekker and Van Dale in the fi ght against popular credulity. Cornelis van 
Beughem, a publisher and famous bibliographer from Emmerich, made regular 
visits to Holland for his bibliographical work and regularly visited Bayle as well as 
Rabus on the way. Rabus and Beughem were colleagues in the publishing business 
and they were on friendly terms. Curious about the recent fad about divining, and 
being told that Beughem had the gift of divining, Rabus proposed a trial. After 
some successful demonstrations, Van Beughem suggested that the spectators take 
a try. One by one, they tried, without success, but when Rabus’ wife took her turn, 
the twig shook and trembled almost as strongly as in the hands of Van Beughem.66 
As a result, Rabus became an ardent supporter of divining with a rod, published 
many articles on this topic in the Boekzaal, and performed tests with his wife in 
the presence of many witnesses in diff erent locations in Holland. In the autumn of 
1696, for instance, Rabus and his wife were travelling from North-Holland back 
to Rotterdam, and they met Rabus’ publisher, Pieter Van der Slaart, in Amster-
dam. Van der Slaart, a close connection also of Bayle, organised some new tests 
and demonstrations for a company of sceptical literati and publishers. 
Living in a literary profession characterised by intense competition, rela-
tions were often tense, and this showed in the course of the events. Even after 
experiments that one side considered entirely satisfactory, the other side did 
not want to give credit to Rabus and his wife. Th is started a vehement con-
troversy, fought out between diff erent factions in the publishing world, and 
publicized in pamphlets, books and journal issues during 1697. Major Dutch 
intellectuals became involved, such as Van Leeuwenhoek, already mentioned, 
but also Anthonie Van Dale, Benjamin Furly, the poet Katharine Lescailje and 
many others. Th e linguists Lambert Ten Kate and Jan Trioen, members of the 
Collegium Physicum Harlemense, became Rabus’s strongest opponents. Th ey 
were Collegiants, a religious sect known for their abhorrence of authority and 
hierarchy, and this refl ected in their sceptical attitude and radical progressive 
65 On Rabus and the Boekzaal, see esp. J.J.V.M. De Vet, Pieter Rabus (1660–1702), een 
wegbereider van de Noordnederlandse verlichting, Amsterdam, 1980; Hans Bots, ed., Pieter Rabus 
en de Boekzaal van Europe (1692–1702), Amsterdam: Holland University Press, 1974.
66 On this controversy, see Koen Vermeir, “Circulating Knowledge or Superstition? Th e 
Dutch Debate on Divination,” in Silent Messengers: Th e Circulation of Material Objects of 
Knowledge in the Early Modern Low Countries, ed. Sven Dupré and Christoph Herbert Lüthy, 
Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011, pp. 293–328.
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ideas. Th eir religious and social convictions determined their epistemic at-
titude and their dismissal of the divining rod.67 
Bayle personally knew many of those involved in the controversy. Rabus 
was an acquaintance and Bayle lauded Beughem for his bibliographical work 
while the latter provided Bayle with books. Bayle had been an international 
contact for Leeuwenhoek for some time and he knew Anthonie Van Dale well. 
Furthermore, he was a close friend of Furly, the rich merchant who hosted an 
intellectual salon (“the Lantern”) and who served as a contact between Bayle, 
Locke and Shaftesbury.68 It was Furly who hosted one of the experiments with 
Rabus’ wife, and it was said that he was entirely convinced of the effi  cacy of 
the rod. At the house of Van Dale, Rabus’ wife did more tests in the presence 
of more than ten sceptical spectators, but this time, she failed to get it right. 
Rabus blamed the failure on the presence of so many people in a small room, 
and all had golden coins in their pockets, which disturbed the proper working 
of the divining. Katharine Lescailje, however, showed everyone how one could 
manipulate the rod by sleight of hand, bolstering the case of the sceptics.69 In 
the last days of May 1697, at the instigation of the bookseller Wetstein, an-
other c lose friend of Bayle, experiments were performed with the son of Van 
Beughem, at the house of the merchant Pieter Coolaart in Haarlem, in the 
presence of Anthonie Van Dale.70 Th is time, the experiments were successful, 
67 See Vermeir, “Circulating Knowledge or Superstition?”, pp. 318–325.
68 On Rabus e.g. Bayle to Minutoli, 8 March 1694; on Beughem see Bayle to Minutoli, 5 
March 1693; on Leeuwenhoek, see e.g. Cluver to Bayle, 8/18 June 1685; and Justel to Bayle, 
10 August 1684. On Furly, see W.H Barber, “Pierre Bayle, Benjamin Furly and Quakerism,” 
in De l’humanisme aux Lumières. Bayle et le protestantisme. Mélanges en l’honneur d’Élisabeth 
Labrousse, Oxford: Th e Voltaire Foundation, 1996, pp. 623–634. For local sociability in Rot-
terdam, see Jori Zijlmans, Vriendenkringen in de zeventiende eeuw. Verenigingsvormen van het 
informele culturele leven te Rotterdam, Th e Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1999.
69 Th e copies in which the details of this case are described can be found in libraries in Rot-
terdam and Th e Hague. Th e fi rst pamphlet, Anonymus, Nodige Verantwoordinge van de Heer 
Pieter Rabus, en Juff r. zyn Huysvrouw, Tegens de Amsterdammers en Haarlemmers. Niet gelovende 
de werking der Wichelroeden. 24 pp. can be found bound into the copy owned by the Municipal 
Library of Rotterdam of Pieter Rabus, De Weergalooze Dichter P.J. Beronicius, ten deele voor de 
Nederduitsche vertaalt. Met een bijvoegsel in de voorreden van ‘s mans leven door P. Rabus. De 
tweede druk, Amsterdam, 1692 (Municipal Library Rotterdam, sign. 1394 F7). Th e second 
pamphlet, Anonymus, Panegyricus voor den onvergelĳkelĳken heros Panour Gopolusopho Panto-
graphus sĳnde een vervolg van de nodige verantwoording voor de heer P. Rabus, is part of the Dutch 
Pamphlet Series at the Dutch Royal Library in Den Haag, pamphlet nr. 14404.
70 I found the original manuscript of the proceedings, written down by Izaak vander Vinne, 
in the Amsterdam University Library: Izaak vander Vinne, Ondervindingen wegens de Wichel-
roede (1697) Manuscript, Bijzondere Collecties Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam, hs. VIII 
E2. Vander Vinne reported Coolaart’s eyewitness account and wrote it down on the 23rd of June 
1697. On Wetstein, see e.g. Bayle to Mr***, 31 March 1698. Wetstein also served as a contact 
point and relay station for Bayle’s correspondence, see e.g. the letter of Wetstein to Ménage, 
22 February 1691 (printed in Richard G. Maber, ed., Publishing in the Republic of Letters: Th e 
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and Vander Vinne, who reported the case, believes that Coolaart was convinced 
that it was a natural phenomenon. Coolaart did not want to express his judge-
ment publicly, however, and he even asked the participants to keep their meet-
ing secret, because he did not want to become part of a scandal. 
At the height of this controversy, in May and June 1697, Bayle wrote to the 
young Du Bos, one of his important informants in Paris, for advice. “Th ere 
is in Harlem a Society of physicists”, he writes, “that occupies itself with do-
ing experiments. Th ey have recently published a letter in Flemish against the 
author of a Journal des scavans [the Boekzaal] that is published every second 
month here in the same language.” Bayle explains that the subject of the dis-
pute is the wife of this author, who is supposed to fi nd gold with a divining 
rod. “It is certain that this rod has turned in the presence of many people,” 
Bayle continues, “but the physicians of Harlem […] pretend that she makes 
the rod turn by sleight of hand when she knows that there is gold close by.”71 
After some delay, Du Bos answered dismissively that the Dutch “bourgeoises” 
probably fl aunted an old Parisian fashion. “No one here doubts that Jacques 
Aymar was nothing more than a rogue and that he would fi nd no one to 
dupe anymore among the savants.”72 Bayle concluded that the Parisian elite 
had made up its mind concerning the divining rod. In his reply to Du Bos, 
Bayle states that “one of our unbelievers, having succeeded in being present, 
remarked that it is nothing more than sleight of hand, and he has made the 
rod turn on a thousand occasions, without that there had been gold nor silver 
around him.”73 Even if he had briefl y wavered, infl uenced by the opinion of 
his close associates and the local Dutch intelligentsia (Bekker, Van Dale, Leeu-
wenhoek, Furly, Van Beughem, Rabus, and others were sympathetic towards 
the divining rod or even practiced divining), Bayle decided to follow the Pa-
risian point of view. He did not even incorporate the Dutch controversy in 
his Dictionnaire. As always, Bayle was focused on textual source criticism, and 
he found hearsay or personal experience more diffi  cult to deal with. Further-
more, as Du Bos’s answer had shown him, including the Dutch event could 
only invoke the ridicule of his peers. Bayle’s local sociability and professional 
Ménage–Grævius–Wetstein Correspondence 1679–1692, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005, p. 125). 
Wetstein would also be involved in publishing the 1730 edition of Bayle’s Dictionnaire.
71 Bayle to Du Bos, 13 May 1697 (Th e letters Bayle refers to are the pamphlets mentioned in 
note 74). I would like to thank Antony McKenna for sending me his transcription of this letter.
72 Du Bos to Bayle, 14 June 1697. Th e letter also mentions the “sotises” presented in the 
Th éâtre Italien by Gherardi, a book Bayle certainly knew (according to Du Bos). If Bayle had 
indeed read the Th éâtre Italien, he might have enjoyed a comedy on the divining rod parody-
ing the Aymar case. Jean-François Regnard, “La Baguette de Vulcan,” in Le Th éâtre Italien, ed. 
Evaristo Gherardi, vol. IV, Amsterdam: Braakman, 1701, pp. 211–238. 
73 Bayle to Du Bos, 12 August 1697. Bayle remarks that the physician Christian Hartsoeker 
would publish a letter in which he explains “mechanically” the movement of the rod. Such a pub-
lication by Hartsoeker is unknown to us. Note that to explain something “mechanically” means 
here “by pressure of the hand”, while for Vallemont it meant “by a theory of invisible corpuscles”.
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relations did not countervail the dismissive attitude of Bayle’s international 
contacts. For Bayle, the sceptical and dismissive stance in the last version of 
his “Abaris” article therefore still adequately refl ected the consensus in the 
international Republic of Letters. 
In the meantime, however, fresh news about Aymar himself had reached 
Bayle. In the April 1697 issue of the Mercure Historique et Politique (p. 440–
441), it was reported that Aymar was still active in the province, even after 
being rejected in Paris. Th is time, Aymar had found the parents of a foundling 
with his rod. Bayle decided to include this story, because it was an interest-
ing new development in the Aymar case: it had appeared in an international 
journal, and was easy to rebut. It became another layer to the “Abaris” entry 
in the 1702 edition of the Dictionnaire, adding to an already extensive set of 
footnotes on the Aymar case, now running to several pages.74 By the time he 
was fi nishing the second edition of the “Abaris” entry, Bayle had fi nally made 
up his mind about the divining rod, and he decided to chastise the journalists 
who reported the story. He argued that we cannot be certain of the truth of 
this story published in the Mercure, and he even casts doubt on the honesty 
of the journalists. Th e story was probably just invented by them: there are 
always people who love fi ction, and ill-intentioned journalists know that few 
people will take the trouble to check the veracity of the story. Here we can 
see Bayle’s strong criticism of the dissemination of errors—sometimes by con-
scious fraud—coming to the fore. His method of textual criticism prompted 
him to look for vested interests behind the text. Even if the story were true as 
narrated, Bayle argued, it is not enough to convince the incredulous. Indeed, 
there are other explanations possible, and one does not have to accept that 
divination with a rod is possible. Bayle now also suggested specifi c interests 
that might have guided the actions described by the journalists: maybe Aymar 
knew everything about the secret relationship of the foundling’s parents by 
informants. It might all be a frame-up, and Aymar’s informants probably had 
their reasons for bringing it to light in this way, without exposing their iden-
tity or intentions.75
One year later, not long after adding these new developments to the entry 
on Abaris and sending the fi nal copy to the printers, Bayle received a letter by 
Pierre Buissière, the apothecary of the Prince de Condé. Buissière had written 
a detailed denunciation of Aymar, published anonymously in 1694, which 
had not been noticed by Bayle. Here Buissière pointed out that many mis-
leading accounts of the fi rst experiments initiated by the Prince de Condé had 
circulated. Aymar’s supporters had even “written in Holland and England, & 
had presented all these impostures as something true and certain”, something 
74 Bayle, Dictionnaire, 1702 edition, art. Abaris, note H. Bayle now added marginal notes 
to the earlier material, giving temporal indications that it was written in 1693.
75 On Bayle’s criteria for distinguing impostors from fanatics and on the causes of error, see 
Bost, Pierre Bayle. Historien, critique et moraliste, p. 26; Labroussse, Hétérodoxie et rigorisme, Ch. 3
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Buissière set out to rectify in his printed letter.76 When he read the fi rst edition 
of the Dictionnaire, however, he found that Bayle too “was not entirely well 
informed”.77 Also a Huguenot, forced to convert after the Edict of Nantes, 
Buissière was a great admirer of Bayle’s independent spirit, and he took the 
liberty to send this printed letter to Bayle, via the intermediary Mr. Ogier. 
Bayle inquired for more information, and Buissière sent a long letter, dated 
25 July 1698, in response. Note that the printing of the letter A for the second 
edition of the Dictionnaire began on 26 May 1698, the entry “Adam” was be-
ing printed in June, and on 18 August, the letter A was ready. Bussière’s letter 
came too late, therefore, for inclusion in the text of the second edition. Bayle 
was fascinated by the new material, however, and added it to the fi rst volume 
of the second edition as “Additions & corrections pour le I. tome” (these would 
be incorporated in the body of the text in a later 1706 edition).
Th e letter provided Bayle, as he put it, with the “most positive proof” 
that Aymar was a cheat, and he copied and paraphrased long passages from 
it in the fi nal notes to the Abaris entry. Buissière described how Aymar had 
confessed his imposture to the Prince de Condé. After this admission, Buis-
sière wrote, Aymar received 30 golden coins from the Prince, so that he would 
return to his village. Buissière also mentions a fourteen-year old boy, who had 
been trained and managed by a gentleman to do similar tricks with a divining 
rod. After shutting him up for several days without contact with this gentle-
man, some money, promises and threats made the little boy confess that it was 
all a trick. For Bayle, this was conclusive evidence, but he did not consider 
that the Prince too might have had specifi c interests in exposing Aymar, nor 
does he criticize the means by which the confessions were extorted from the 
diviners. (Balthasar Bekker, in this respect was diff erent. In the chapter after 
his account of the Aymar case, he explained why the confessions of those 
accused of magic should not be trusted, partly because of perverse juridical 
procedures, partly because the victims had an overheated imagination).78
 Indicating that he was still very much preoccupied with the case, Bayle 
kept adding to the note when he received more information. He worked on 
the addenda till the end, in the fall of 1701, before fi nishing the second edi-
tion of the Dictionnaire in November–December 1701. In the fi nal changes 
to the “Abaris” addenda, he included Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s opinions on 
the divining rod. Indeed, in 1694, Leibniz had already written on the Aymar 
case, but Bayle only took notice of it in a work by Georg Pasch.79 Leibniz 
76 Pierre Buissière, Lettre à M. l’abbé D.L., sur les véritables eff ets de la baguette de Jacques 
Aymar, Paris, 1694. (Citation from p. 14.)
77 Buissière to Bayle, 25 July 1698. I am grateful to Antony McKenna for giving me access 
to the manuscript of the letter and for his corrections to my transcription.
78 Bekker, Betoverde Weereld, Book 4, Chapter 24 (idem in the 1694 French edition).
79 Georg Pasch, De inventis nov-antiquis, Leipzig, 1700, p. 779. Note that Kurfürstin So-
phie Charlotte of Hannover, a close friend of Leibniz, met Bayle on 26 October 1700. She had 
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explained that he knew about the Aymar case through personal connections 
and patronage networks. He got an account from Benedicta Henrietta Phili-
pina, the Duchess of Hannover (the widow of Johannes Friedrich von Han-
nover), who lived in Paris at the time of the controversy. A sister-in-law of the 
Prince de Condé, she had been involved in the experiments with Aymar, and 
she had discovered that he was a fraud.80 Leibniz also cultivated a correspon-
dence with Abbé Nicaise and other friends of Bayle on the subject. In one of 
his letters, he had a good laugh at the Cartesians who tried to explain the case 
without making sure about the facts.81 For Bayle, all these attestations from 
leading fi gures in the Republic of Letters proved that Aymar  was a fraud, and 
he left aside a closer investigation of the Dutch controversy. He might have 
recalled his own phrases written years before, in a letter to Minutoli: “I have 
never better understood until this hour […] how much it is dangerous to be 
mistaken, when one applies one’s judgment to things far away.”82 He did not 
take the step of getting involved and making a personally informed judgment, 
however, when these things came closer by.
Rationalism, scepticism and superstition
In this paper, I have shown how Pierre Bayle changed his assessment of 
a wondrous event that took place while he was composing the fi rst article of 
his Dictionnaire. Bayle’s dictionary was like the result of a long sedimentation 
process, and can be read as a palimpsest. By careful textual, paratextual and 
contextual analysis, I have uncovered the diff erent stages in the composition 
of the Abaris entry. Th is approach is especially eff ective because of Bayle’s 
curious writing habits and his “encyclopaedic” passion for adding material 
without changing or removing earlier text. Bayle’s textual practice also re-
fl ects his critical method and epistemic attitude. In his Projet, he explained 
that he aimed at representing diff erent sides of a discussion (for reasons of 
earlier taken an interest in the Aymar case (she was the niece and sister-in-law of Benedicta 
Henrietta Philipina, who was involved in the unmasking of Aymar by the Prince de Condé) 
and had corresponded with Leibniz about it. One may wonder whether it might have been a 
topic of discussion between Bayle and Sophie Charlotte.
80 See Leibniz to Tenzel, 16 January 1694. Th e case was also publicized for the German 
public in Wilhelm Ernst Tenzel’s journal, the Monatliche Unterredungen, 1693, pp. 606–617.
81 In a letter to some of Bayle’s friends, including Daniel Larroque, on 19/29 June 1693, 
and Nicaise, on 15 mai 1693, Leibniz claims that they had also done many experiments with 
divining rods in Germany. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Er-
ste Reihe: Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel, vol. 9: 1693, Berlin: Akademie-
Ausgabe, 1975, pp. 486–488; and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, ed. 
Karl Immanuel Gerhardt, Berlin: Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 2, p. 540 respectively.
82 Bayle to Minutoli, 11 March 1691.
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“prudence”)83, and his layered system of footnotes and marginal notes allowed 
him to make diff erent kinds of comments. He interpreted his task as a work 
of “compilation”, projecting to make an “Ouvrage de compilation” rather than 
an “Ouvrage de raisonnement”.84 Too much focus on reason would only lead to 
controversies, he judged, which would be unpleasant for everyone.85 
Bayle’s original plan was to write a Dictionnaire that would contain a 
collection and refutation of all the errors that circulated in the Republic of 
Letters, something he called at some point the “dustbin of the Republic of 
Letters”.86 Th e entry “Abaris” was started during the transition between this 
old project and the new Dictionnaire, and it kept evolving in its diff erent 
stages and editions. In this way, the Aymar case becomes a touchstone that 
guides and changes Bayle’s thinking about errors. In the Projet, he still had a 
rather pedantic view of the errors of the Republic of Letters, as the collection 
of all the mistakes in Moréri’s and other dictionaries, and he refused to make 
a diff erence between signifi cant and insignifi cant errors.87 Most of the errors 
he corrected were erudite references and citations considering mythological 
fi gures, and from the start he had diffi  culties justifying the utility of this en-
terprise.88 In the confrontation with the Aymar case, however, although in 
some sense an insignifi cant aff air, he became more sensitive to the rejection of 
concrete errors in judgement. In his reaction to the case, we can follow Bayle’s 
development as a critical writer. 
So how did Bayle fi nally make up his mind in the concrete case of the 
Aymar controversy? I have shown that Bayle informed himself about multiple 
opinions and authorities. In this respect, the Republic of Letters was crucial 
for his view on knowledge and critical practice. He needed the constant infl ux 
of letters, the journal issues that recounted the latest developments in the case, 
the summaries of the recent books published on the matter, in order to make 
an assessment and to weigh the diff erent opinions. In the beginning, he was 
careful not to make an explicit judgement, using ambiguous terms that could 
be read as subtle irony. Indeed, Bayle defended a suspension of judgement 
until all sides of a controversy were heard, including the reciprocal rebuttals 
and replies (Projet, §3). Far from taking any extreme position by endorsing 
or rejecting the phenomenon, his fi rst judgement seems rather neutral (Buis-
sière even felt compelled to set him straight and to send Bayle his devastating 
critique of Aymar). Bayle safeguarded himself by means of conditionals such 
as “si tout ce que l’on en dit étoit veritable” or “quoy qu’il en soit”, maintaining 
83 Projet, §3.
84 Projet, sig *2 recto, and the preface to the 1697 edition of the Dictionnaire, p. 7.
85 Projet, sig *3 recto.
86 “Un ramas des ordures de la Republique des Lettres”, see Projet, §5.
87 Projet, §7.
88 See the long but unconvincing defence in the Projet (§ 8) and the disavowal of his Projet 
in the preface to his Dictionnaire (1697 edition).
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the ambiguity, but he did not restrain himself in extolling the utility of such 
a rod. According to his principles, the phenomenon itself was certainly not 
impossible, physically speaking, so he was open to positive as well as negative 
proofs. Only when he received “clear” evidence (however diffi  cult this was to 
establish), about the experiments of the Prince de Condé, he made stronger 
pronouncements that Aymar was a fraud.
It should be noted that Bayle’s eventual denunciation of Aymar should not 
be reduced to a typical “Enlightenment” criticism of superstition. Such a view 
on “superstition” would be anachronistic and it would be a misinterpretation 
of Bayle’s engagement with the case.89 In the Dictionnaire, he gave a general 
critique of all kinds of mistakes, including both popular and scholarly errors. 
Furthermore, Bayle’s criticism of Aymar should not be put in terms of ra-
tionalism versus superstition. Th e Aymar case could very well be defended on 
rational grounds, and Vallemont elaborated a book-length Cartesian natural 
philosophy of the divining rod. What is more, the most important rationalists 
of the time, such as Malebranche, and the fi ercest critics of popular credu-
lity, such as Bekker and Van Dale, all accepted that the divining rod actually 
worked. Th e divining rod could be interpreted as “superstition”, but only in 
the traditional sense of the word, namely, as excessive or illegitimate religion.90 
Th e question of the “naturalness” of divining with a rod was therefore central 
to the debate. Interpreted as a practice only effi  cacious because of an implicit 
pact with the devil, it became the main example around which Le Brun wrote 
his Histoire critique des pratiques superstitieuses.91 Importantly, it was possible 
for the famous critic of superstition, Balthasar Bekker, to invert Le Brun’s 
reasoning. He defended the naturalness of Aymar’s feats in order to attack 
what he considered “superstitious”, i.e. Le Brun’s own excessive belief in the 
power and involvement of the devil in this world. By considering the divining 
rod as a part of Cartesian natural philosophy, he could denounce Le Brun as 
“superstitious”.
Bayle’s changing assessment of the Aymar case partly informed and partly 
followed a more general evolution in his thought. In the Projet, he was still 
very optimistic about the possibility of correcting errors of fact. He assumes 
that everyone will be able to agree about errors of fact, when confronted with 
89 In his book on the comet of 1680, Bayle did make a contribution against “superstition”, 
in its still dominant sense of false religious belief, by arguing that the comet was not a sign of 
God, only a natural phenomenon that followed the laws of nature.
90 Divination, the searching for hidden things, usually by an implicit or explicit pact with 
the devil, was one of the traditional instances of “superstition”. Cf. Bernard Dompnier, “Les 
hommes d’Eglise et la superstition entre XVIIe et XVIII siècles,” in La Superstition à l’âge des 
Lumières, ed. Bernard Dompnier, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1998, pp. 13–47.
91 Le Brun published his fi rst response to the Aymar case in Pierre Le Brun, Lettres qui dé-
couvrent l’illusion des philosophes sur la baguette, Paris: Jean Boudot, 1693 (Reprinted in 1696), 
a work which was later expanded into his Pierre Le Brun, Histoire critique des pratiques supersti-
tieuses, Paris: J. de Nully, 1702 (a work which went through many subsequent editions).
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the detailed proofs, “because the proofs of an error of fact are not the preju-
dices of a nation, or of a particular Religion, they are Maxims common to all 
men.”92 Already somewhat suspicious of abstract reason, however, he want-
ed to avoid metaphysics and theology because of their controversial nature. 
In contrast, historical facts could attain the status of “common notions” on 
which everyone can agree. With historical analysis, “one shows certainly the 
falseness of many things, the uncertainty of many others, and the truth of 
many others”.93 Dismissing historical Pyrrhonism, Bayle argued that history 
can even attain a “degree of certainty more indubitable” than geometry (even 
if we have to admit that history and geometry concern diff erent kinds of truth 
and certainty). Nevertheless, already in his Projet, Bayle expressed a kind of 
“scepticism” that would become central to his methodology; or to put it in a 
better way, from his personal experience of scholarship, he came to recognize 
the challenge that came with a critical spirit: “After having read the Critique of 
a Work, one believes oneself disabused of many false facts, that one had taken 
for true while reading them. One passes thus from affi  rmation to negation; 
but if one reads a good response to this Critique, one hardly omits to go back 
to one’s fi rst affi  rmation about certain things, while on the other hand, one 
passes to the negation of certain things that one had accepted at the word of 
this Critique. One experiences a similar revolution, when one has read a good 
retort to the response. Well then, is this situation not capable of throwing 
most readers into continual mistrust (défi ance)?”94 
Th is is Bayle’s concrete “scepticism”, originating in his own personal expe-
rience: the wavering of belief he is enduring, based on contrary “revolutions” 
in opinion. Th is is not the “scepticism” described in the notes of the articles 
Pyrrhon or Zénon d’Elée, but it is the critical spirit, the mistrust that defi es 
dogmatism, that lies at the core of his project. In the Project, Bayle was still 
optimistic about attaining historical truth and certainty, and this was also 
necessary to start the project, but he is also keenly aware of the problem he 
faces. Th is predicament became even clearer in the course of the Aymar case: 
Bayle received contradictory evidence, for and against Aymar, with every piece 
of news he received from the Republic of Letters. Bayle came to see that rea-
son usually does not lead to the resolution of a debate, and is not able to halt 
the perennial movement of criticism, reply and retort. When he is writing the 
Dictionnaire, it becomes clear that he is more interested in this movement of 
the critical spirit than in the uncontroversial facts. Th e “true”, “historical” part 
of an entry is represented in the main text, which is usually shallow and short, 
while the unending to-and-fro of opinions and controversies are explored in the 
92 Projet, §9. For an analysis of common notions or maxims in Bayle, see Mori, “Pierre 




dense and interminable footnotes.95 It is important to resolve debates if possible, 
although in many cases one needs to take a stand even if there is no absolute 
certainty possible. Bayle’s comes to see most of historical knowledge as fallible, 
as always revisable, and his work is an ongoing project that he knows he cannot 
possibly complete on his own. He admits of his possible errors, he asks the ad-
vice and criticism of his peers, and he is always prepared to make revisions and 
corrections in the diff erent stages and editions of his work.96 
During the Aymar case, Bayle became more and more aware of the diffi  -
culties involved in establishing natural and historical truth. Reason was weak 
in deciding about the principles of nature, and Vallemont, Rabus as well as 
Malebranche and Le Brun had rational arguments to defend their mutually 
confl icting views.97 Also, empirical evidence was diffi  cult to judge. Vallemont 
had noted in the introduction to his Physique Occulte that he had taken care 
to do many experiments with Aymar, three hours a day, for a period of one 
month. Th e facts were therefore well established and he could be sure it was 
not a new “golden tooth” case. Yet it is exactly on this point that Vallemont 
becomes the laughingstock of Leibniz and Du Bos.98 If one month of repeated 
experiments is not suffi  cient to make a justifi ed assessment, however, how 
should one decide on the case? Du Bos reads into Vallemont’s claims, assur-
ing the veracity of the facts, the exaggeration and trust-winning language of a 
co man. But did Leibniz, Du Bos and Bayle have better grounds for denying 
the working of the divining rod, if they based their judgment only on hearsay, 
personal correspondence and published accounts? At least, Buissière did his own 
95 Th e theoretical question whether Bayle was a “sceptic” is not so relevant for this article. 
Furthermore, Bayle did not aim to be a systematic philosopher, and his theoretical views that we 
can fi nd in footnotes and clarifi cations are part of this to-and-fro of opinions, which were made 
in specifi c contexts of controversies, responses and defences. More important, I believe, is to un-
derstand his critical method and practice, which includes his method of “compilation”, his special 
use of footnotes to present diff erent points of view, his critical apparatus for establishing histori-
cal proof, all of which are crucial for his epistemic goals. In order to correct concrete errors and 
attain specifi c historical truths, it is not useful to pit rationalism and scepticism against each other. 
Instead, it is crucial to present and analyse diff erent accounts, in order to make arguments do 
concrete work for specifi c purposes, to present all the available proofs, and to avoid prejudice 
and overhasty conclusions.
96 See the preface to the 1697 edition of the Dictionnaire, p. 8
97 Bayle complimented Vallemont on his rational (mechanical) explanations of the divining 
rod, but he never cared to engage with them.
98 For Leibniz, see Leibniz to Basnage (no date), in Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, 
vol. 3, p. 113. Du Bos writes : “Ce qui est de plus plaisant pour un philosophe dans cette his-
toire c’est que Vallemont asseure au comencement de son livre, que l’avanture de la dent d’or 
raportée par M. Vandale, l’a rendu sage, et que auparavant entreprendre l’explication du pro-
dige il s’est assuré de son existence. Fiez vous après cela aux dépositions des autheurs!” (Du Bos 
to Bayle, 27 April 1696). Of course, Du Bos did not know that it would be Van Dale himself 
who would judge rather favorably on the divining rod, and he would host experiments with the 
divining rod a few months later.
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experiments with Aymar, but on what grounds did Bayle consider him more 
credible than Vallemont? In the Projet, Bayle explains that historical certainty 
is possible, but only when all sides of the controversy have already agreed that 
there is a fact of the matter.99 Th e problem with the Aymar case is that, if he is 
an impostor, the reported feats may all be “fi ctional”. Buissière even assumes a 
conspiracy, in which Aymar’s supporters uphold the fi ction, because they gain 
by it (because they are part of the plot, or because describing such marvels allows 
them to sell their books). In the end, Bayle even considers that the journalists 
reporting on the case are co men, who try to sell attractive stories that no one 
will care to check. Bayle needed to make a judgement on the natural possibility 
of divining, on the veracity and correct interpretation of the actual course of 
historical events, and on the credibility of his sources. Th is was not an easy task, 
because everything could be cast into doubt in infi nitely diff erent ways.
In his writing, Bayle tried to avoid being subject to doubts and wavering 
in opinion as much as possible, by carefully framing and formulating his judg-
ments, yet as we have seen, he was still susceptible to this oscillating move-
ment. He was thrown in doubt once more when the controversy fl ared up 
in his own town, Rotterdam, with many of his acquaintances involved. As is 
clear from his correspondence, he informed himself again about the consensus 
on the divining rod in the Republic of Letters. It was only with the letters of 
Du Bos and Buissière, confi rmed by news of Leibniz’s opinion, that Bayle fi -
nally made up his mind. “Dans la derniere évidence”, he wrote, Aymar himself 
had confessed that he was a fraud, and it seemed diffi  cult to argue with that 
(if one overlooks how this admission was extorted). When we place Bayle in 
his local context of a renewed divining controversy at Rotterdam, it becomes 
conspicuous that he avoids any personal experience, even if he is very curious 
about the phenomenon. Th is is in marked contrast to the Dutch savants, like 
Bekker, Van Dale, Van Leeuwenhoek or Rabus, who did actual experiments 
with the divining rod. Given Bayle’s contacts with these men, it would not 
have been diffi  cult to become personally involved if he had desired to do so. 
He may have wanted to keep his impartiality, or maybe he felt more comfort-
able examining texts instead of real experience. In any case, it remains striking 
that when the controversy raged around the corner, he rather chose to inquire 
about the prevailing opinion in Paris. 
On the one hand, the Aymar case brings the weakness of Bayle’s method 
to the fore, which guarantees no fi nal stability. On the other hand, instead of 
despairing in the face of historical uncertainty, Bayle views this weakness as 
a strength, because it allows reinforcing one’s critical spirit, to “fortify one’s 
judgment against the habit that one has of reading without attention, & of 
99 Th e disagreements he can solve are only about the relations between these facts, e.g. 
whether “a certain Prince has ruled before or after another” (Projet, §5.) To avoid complica-
tions, Bayle excludes fi ctional accounts, and presumes his information is not of the kind “re-
ported by Ariosto, or by the other narrators of fi ctions” (ibid.).
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believing without examination.”100 In the end, Bayle tried to resolve the scep-
tical stalemate on the Aymar case, the to-and-fro of opinions, not by reason 
or experience, but by following the consensus that had developed in the Re-
public of Letters, which, for Bayle, centered around the social and intellectual 
elite in Paris. Seeing Aymar as an impostor also confi rmed Bayle’s ingrained 
mistrust of fads and enthusiasms. It was more attractive to accept the author-
ity of an urban and political elite over matters of fact than to inquire more 
into the troubling developments closer to home.101 
Conclusion
Instead of studying the theoretical assertions that we can fi nd dispersed in 
Bayle’s oeuvre, I have focussed on his actual critical method and practice in 
writing his Dictionnaire. In this article, I have analysed in detail the textual and 
paratextual characteristics of the “Abaris” entry, by looking at notebooks, an-
nouncements, prefaces, the page layout, the way footnotes are presented, tem-
poral indications in the text, cross-references, corrections and addenda, as well 
as changes between subsequent print runs and editions. I have combined this 
approach with a study of contextual information, such as Bayle’s pronounce-
ments on how he composed the Dictionnaire, the timing and contents of cor-
respondence as well as the timing of the publication of books and journal issues 
read by Bayle. In this way, I was able to show the evolution of the entry, the 
additions made at diff erent stages, and the changes of emphasis and judgement 
introduced by Bayle. I have shown that Bayle’s practice is complex, sometimes 
full of confl icts and contradictions, and is not reducible to the theoretical views 
he formulated in the footnotes to some of his entries. Indeed, in the Projet, Bayle 
already mused about the problems involved in putting theory into practice, ad-
mitting that any ideal of perfection would be lost, and that the result would be 
a motley and mishmash without uniformity (Projet, §5).
I have argued that looking at Bayle’s method and practice gives us insight to 
his concrete epistemic preoccupations. During his response to the Aymar case, 
he needed to judge the infl ow of contradictory arguments and information, and 
he becomes more critical of the power of reason and experience to solve impor-
tant problems. Most importantly, Bayle needed to assess the credibility of his 
informants, and in the end, he decides to take the side of the political elite, ig-
noring the opinions of his friends and associates in his hometown. In the course 
of this controversy, an opposition was constructed between the opinions held by 
the elite members of the Republic of Letters and local or provincial beliefs. As 
100 See the entry “Horatius (Publius)” in the Dictionnaire.
101 In natural philosophy, the social rank of witnesses was very important for establishing 
matters of fact. (See Shapin, A Social History of Truth.) Furthermore, the House of Condé had 
shown itself rather favorable toward Protestants (visible e.g. in their continuing support for 
Buissière), which may have made a positive impression on Bayle. 
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a result of Bayle’s intervention and the wide circulation of the Dictionnaire, the 
divining rod would become dismissed as “superstition” (in the modern sense) 
by Enlightenment critics. At the very end of the notes to the Abaris entry, Bayle 
compared the Aymar case to the wondrous cure mentioned in the introduction 
of this article, affi  rming that it is all popular credulity. At the same time, he 
becomes more pessimistic about the impact of his fi ght against errors and credu-
lity. People do not need much coaxing by others; their own credulity is suffi  cient 
in itself to be seduced by deception and imposture, Bayle writes. Furthermore, 
this credulity seems to be incurable. Even if a cheat is exposed, people forget it 
very quickly, and in a few years, we will see the same comedy all over again. For 
Bayle, the story of Aymar’s new successes in the province was suffi  cient proof of 
this. Reason is indeed limited in its power, also in convincing others, and error 
might in the end have the upper hand.
Th e last known episode of the Aymar case can serve as a fi nal illustration that 
Bayle’s critical practice kept challenging and eluding his theoretical views. Bayle 
is widely known and respected for his promotion of toleration. He himself was a 
victim, of course, of Huguenot persecution and of the intolerant accusations and 
harassments by Jurieu. Bayle’s Commentaire Philosophique was one of the major 
early modern arguments for toleration, and instigated a long polemical battle with 
his foe. Although Bayle believed that epistemic errors had to be corrected when 
possible (despite all the diffi  culties involved), he argued that theological errors 
should be tolerated. He argued that certainty was impossible to achieve in mat-
ters of religion, and therefore toleration for alternative opinions was imperative.102 
Although Bayle thought it was possible to arrive at certainty concerning many 
factual errors and commons notions, it was clear that many historical and natu-
ral facts remained uncertain, and his argument seems to imply that one should 
tolerate nonreligious opinions too.103 What is more, religious, epistemic and even 
moral errors were often intertwined; sometimes they even became indistinguish-
able, complicating Bayle’s argument for toleration and his fi ght against errors. 
Th e Aymar controversy was such a case that was very diffi  cult to handle, 
not only because it was so hard to reach a fi nal conclusion on the case with 
any certainty, but also because it blurred the boundaries between the realms 
of the natural, the religious and the moral.104 On the one hand, divining was 
considered superstitious by Le Brun and Malebranche, that is, for them it was 
an illegitimate religious practice or a religious error, and interpreted in this 
way, Bayle’s argument for toleration would seem to hold. On the other hand, 
102 One could never know that one might oneself end up with the alternative point of view. 
Bayle, after all, converted from Protestantism to Catholicism and back to Protestantism within 
only two years (1669–1670).
103 See e.g. Ayers, “Th eories of Knowledge and Belief.”
104 See e.g. Koen Vermeir, “Th e ‘physical prophet’ and the powers of the imagination. Part 
II: a case–study on dowsing and the naturalisation of the moral, 1685–1710,” Studies in history 
and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences 36.1 (2005), pp. 1–24.
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those who argued that divining was a natural phenomenon had to admit that 
it crossed the borderline with the moral. (How could the rod distinguish a 
criminal from someone else, if the only diff erence between them is a moral 
state of guilt?) Indeed, Bayle extolled the possible moral utility of the divining 
rod, before he came to see it as a deception. Finally, if Aymar was an impostor, 
the people he had accused would probably be innocent, making the fraud not 
only epistemically but also morally perverse. 
In a fi nal episode, the Aymar case would take again a new twist, making 
a correct judgment on the case all the more pressing. One year after Bayle’s 
second edition was published, Aymar was put into service by the Maréchal de 
Montrevel, who had been ordered to put down the rebellion of the Camisards, 
the coreligionists of Bayle still living in the south of France.105 In Septem-
ber 1703, Bâville, the administrator of the province, brought Aymar to the 
Cévennes in order to fi nd and identify Protestant dissenters. Aymar used his 
divining technique at the site where a shepherd had been killed, and he found 
eighteen suspects hidden in a nearby farm. On his indication, these Hugue-
nots were summarily executed.106 Th is episode evokes one of Bayle’s crucial 
conundrums after he published the Commentaire: was it necessary to tolerate 
the intolerant? Bayle’s argument seemed to lead to such a conclusion, even 
if he was uneasy about it.107 Bayle was sure, however, that tolerance was not 
appropriate when the civil order was threatened. Th is is arguably what was at 
stake in the Aymar case: the diviner accused innocent people and later he even 
became an instrument of religious and political persecution, menacing civil 
society. Th is cynical account of Aymar’s feats and the ensuing argument of 
intolerance only had force, however, if one could know for certain that Aymar 
was indeed a fraud. If his talents were genuine, as Bayle himself had pointed 
out, he would be a great blessing for society. (Some even suggested that the 
moral benefi ts would still be there, even if Aymar was a fraud, because as long 
as everyone believed in the power of the rod, people would behave impec-
cably). It became therefore crucial to solve the epistemic question, whether 
105 In contrast to Jurieu, who was one of the strongest promoters of their cause, Bayle con-
demned their violent rebellion and their religious fanaticism. Th e Camisard rebellion led to a 
religious civil war, in which the French Protestants attacked villages, burned houses and killed 
the Catholic villagers, out of revenge for a terrible repression. In his turn, the Maréchal chased 
and executed the protestant rebels. Bayle did not know this when he fi nalized his second edi-
tion at the end of 1701, but Aymar would become involved in this violent confl ict.
106 L’Ouvreleuil, a Catholic historian who recorded this story, wrote that at the time few 
people still believed in the rod. He thought that it probably worked by means of a tacit or 
explicit pact with the devil. From this refl ection, he jumps to the fanaticism of the Camisards, 
which to him also seems to be diabolical. He suggests that one diabolical trick might be used to 
eradicate another diabolical evil. See Jean-Baptiste L’Ouvreleuil, Le fanatisme renouvellé, vol. II, 
Avignon: Joseph-Charles Chastanier, 1704, pp. 73–74.
107 Gianluca Mori, “Pierre Bayle, the Rights of the Conscience, the ‘Remedy’ of Toleration,” 
Ratio Juris 10.1 (1997), pp. 45–60.
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divining with a rod was a natural phenomenon or whether it was a sham, with 
certainty, before condemning Aymar and bringing action against him. 
Th e Aymar case exasperated Bayle to such an extent, that his fi nal repudia-
tion of the diviner casts a remarkably unenlightened shadow over his work. 
In order to avoid such impostures again, Bayle advised that the magistrates of 
the city of Lyon should have shown to burn Aymar alive as a wicked magi-
cian (“faire brûler tout vif comme un malheureux magicien”). Furthermore, they 
should have presented him the executioner, with all the instruments of the 
rack, to substantiate the threat (“ils lui eussent presenté le Bourreau avec tous 
les instruments de la question”). According to Bayle, this would quickly have 
procured a confession of how Aymar had secretly learned all about the assas-
sination in Lyons. In this way, the magistrates would easily have found out the 
cheating by which he had been able to follow the criminals.108 Just like judg-
ments about facts, toleration looked good in theory, but it was more diffi  cult 
to achieve in practice. 
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